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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to apply an under-utilized methodology from the branch 
of biophysical economics. Counter to prevailing theory, it is claimed that energy is an 
innate input to production. By applying energy inputs to new fields, its usefulness is 
emphasized. One subject in need of assistance is decision-making in the damming of 
rivers. Unlike any other time, pressure is mounting to decommission an increasing 
number of hydroelectric dams in America. Traditionally, a cost benefit analysis (CBA) 
has been used in the decision-making process, but this tool is not enough. Using energy 
returns on energy invested (EROI) analysis as a supplementary tool to CBA, Glen 
Canyon Dam in northern Arizona was studied. The EROI of the dam was less than 1:3, a 
severely low return on energy investment. Consequently, it is demonstrated that better 
decisions can be made about the status of hydroelectric dams by using EROI analysis. 
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Dedication 
 
Everything in the universe may be described in terms of energy. 
Galaxies, stars, molecules, and atoms may be regarded as organizations 
of energy. Living organisms may be looked upon as engines which 
operate by means of energy derived directly or indirectly from the sun. 
The civilizations, or cultures of mankind, also, may be regarded as a 
form or organization of energy. Culture is an organization of 
phenomena--material objects, bodily acts, ideas, and sentiments--which 
consists of or is dependent upon the use of symbols. Man, being the 
only animal capable of symbol-behavior, is the only creature to possess 
culture. Culture is a kind of behavior. And behavior, whether of man, 
mule, plant, comet or molecule, may be treated as a manifestation of 
energy. Thus we see, on all levels of reality, that phenomena lend 
themselves to description and interpretation in terms of energy.1 
- Leslie A. White, “Energy and the 
Evolution of Culture” 
 
The flow of the river is energy, so is the electricity that comes from the 
dams that block that flow. Human labor is energy; so are the calories 
stored as fat by salmon for their journey upstream. Seen one way, 
energy is an abstraction; seen another it is as concrete as salmon, 
human bodies, and the Grand Coulee Dam.2 
- Richard White, The Organic 
Machine 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
There is a problem inherent with economics today.3 The most authoritative figures 
and texts on the matter seem to know it.4 While some point to flaws in the predictive 
models of macroeconomists that could not foretell the impending Great Recession, others 
take issue with the field’s basic axioms and assumptions about human behavior and 
selfishness.5 To a student of the environment, these claims are beside the point. While 
they certainly hold merit, there is an air of anthropocentricism in them. The ability of a 
model to predict the future, the necessity to include human bias: each contention points to 
a broader theme of “humanism” in the field.6 Contrary to popular belief, there is no 
reason to believe that economies are a uniquely human affair.7 And once one 
acknowledges that the very definition of economics is subject to interpretation, nothing 
seems certain.8  
This is not to say that its flaws make economics a pointless or even poor endeavor. As 
Nobel Laureate Gary S. Becker put it, the power of economics lies in its “…method of 
analysis not [in its] assumption about particular motivations.”9 Put differently, economics 
derives its strength from its ability to contrast and point to connections not typically seen 
as related; it is powerful in its capacity to reveal unforeseen, intimate, and pervasive 
relationships in the world. 
One unanticipated connection that has been tragically overlooked in mainstream 
economics has been the general indifference towards energy as a necessary input to 
production. In economics, there are typically three standard inputs to production. Two are 
commonly taught in microeconomic courses as inputs to the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, which measures the scale of output relative to the rate of input of labor and 
capital. Another input, technology, was later added thanks to Robert M. Solow’s 1950s 
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macroeconomic growth model, which solved problems of the endogeneity of variables in 
other functions such as the Harrod-Domar model. 
The inputs to these models are emblematic of the anthropocentric flaw in economic 
thought today. That is, all three economic inputs are human-derived and are therefore 
contingent upon human action. After all, economies are typically understood as human-
centric. Capital, labor, and technology, however, are all actually dependent upon a fourth 
disregarded input, without which none would exist: energy.10 Energy which is required to 
build, maintain, or operate capital; energy which is necessary to use and adapt 
technology; and, most essentially of all, energy which is pivotal in sustaining and 
creating labor. In no uncertain terms, if there is one single significant flaw that should be 
addressed in the field of economics today, it is the flagrant misattribution with which the 
origin of production and wealth is associated.11  
Emulating Becker’s approach to economics, there must surely be a reason for the 
underrepresentation of energy in production. One could argue that the lack of historical 
representation of energy has held in economics has been largely accidental. On multiple 
occasions economists, such as the 18th Century Physiocrat François Quesnay, attempted 
to place a greater emphasis upon the derivation of wealth from land. For his part, 
Quesnay gained an almost cult-like following from his French contemporaries, and even 
lay influence upon Adam Smith himself. But despite being “more than a century ahead of 
his time,” the Physiocratic school of economic thought would decline in the face of the 
impending agricultural revolution.12  
One cannot mention the development of economic thought regarding land without 
mention of the Reverend Thomas Malthus. Since the release of his writings on 
population, Malthus’s theories have been met with apprehension and disdain.13 This is 
because not since Quesnay and the Physiocrats did a political economist offer a 
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significant theory which so decidedly consigned humanity like chattel to the limits of the 
earth. Despite the nuance of Malthus’ theories, his ideas have largely been consigned to 
the environmental and development branches of economics.14  
In more modern terms one could return to the Nobel Laureate economist Robert M. 
Solow for support. After having produced one of the most influential macroeconomic 
theories of the 20th Century for which he would eventually be granted the Nobel Prize, 
only then did Solow begin to ask the question of what role resources played in 
economics, stating in 1974 that he “ought to find out what economic theory has to say” in 
regards to natural resources.15 Less a critique of Solow than of the field itself, Solow’s 
words are cause to make one wonder how a theory of macroeconomic growth can be 
produced without any appreciation of the world or its resources. 
If historical evidence is not enough, the data yields telling results too. For instance, 
calculations on wealth have been made on numerous occasions using the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, and time and again increases in capital and labor have only managed 
to account for half the increases in economic production. Typically, this residual, or half 
of the wealth unaccounted for, has been attributed to human ingenuity and innovation;16 
an attribution characteristic of the anthropocentric mindset common in economics. 
Nevertheless, according to Charles A. S. Hall, and Kent Klitgaard, leaders in the field of 
biophysical economics which is concerned with the matter of energy in the economy: 
Many economists [have] studied growth of the economy using mathematical 
tools such as Cobb-Douglas production function that focused on labor and 
capital. They [have] always found a large “residual,” that is, about half the 
increase in economic production that could not be explained by the increase in 
labor or capital. This they attributed to technological innovation. But when 
physicist Reiner Kümmel and his colleagues examined very carefully how 
economic goods were produced in the United States, Germany, and Japan in 
recent decades they found that energy was not only important but more 
important than either the capital or the labor that had been used by the 
economists. In other words, when Kümmel added energy to the production 
functions he found that the unexplained residual disappeared and energy was 
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even more powerful than capital or labor in explaining economic growth for 
these countries.17 
 
A powerful explanation, Hall and Klitgaard’s words deserve to be restated. Not only has 
energy shown to be a vital input to production, its significance also completely overtook 
that of typical, human-centric production inputs such as labor and capital. One would 
think such amazing findings would be well regarded if not hotly pursued by economists. 
This, of course, has not been the case as energy remains disregarded as a standard input 
to production. One can speculate why by observing history. 
In the 1970s no one economist made a greater, if under-recognized, contribution to 
the energy-economics movement than Romanian economist Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen.18 With the release of his sui generis book The Entropy Law and the Economic 
Process, Georgescu-Roegen integrated evolutionary biology, conventional economics, 
and thermodynamics to form the field of biophysical economics. In doing so, the 
polymath created in the process a work which economists have since called a “magnum 
opus.”19 His work was so impactful that there was even an unsuccessful movement by 
fellow Romanians to grant the economist a Nobel Prize in Economic Science.20 In no 
uncertain terms, to his adherents Georgescu-Roegen developed the very shift in the 
economic paradigm that has been called for to this day.21 
So how is it that such a transcendent movement could not push energy into the 
spotlight? There are likely many reasons, but one overarching historical trend seems 
clear. Just as land was a topic of economic significance before the agricultural revolution, 
and population was a topic of economic significance before the industrial revolution, so 
too was energy a topic of economic significance during the OPEC crisis of the 1970s.22 
At numerous points in history, Earthly constraints have briefly convinced economists and 
society that production is reliant upon the energy and natural material resources of the 
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world, only to be forgotten during times of economic success, causing humans to again 
ignore their significance. 
It seems to be that the problem thus far in economics has been an issue in scope. Time 
and again history has shown that humans are not quick to adapt to change, even in the 
face of compelling evidence.23 Therefore, theories involving energy and entropy in 
economics, despite their rigor, must be eased into the field. One way of doing so is by 
integrating the concept within a smaller framework and demonstrating the impact it can 
have. One such subject in need of that presents an opportunity to ease energy theory into 
it is choice optimality in the decommissioning of dams. 
 
Dams, CBA, and the Need for a New Approach 
 
Except for the relatively few individuals who directly rely upon dams for their 
livelihoods, most people likely have little notion as to the pervasiveness and history of 
damming in the United States.24 Beginning with the construction of single-purpose dams 
in the 1820s and expanding to multipurpose facilities by the 1930s, the United States has 
long been willing to dam its waterways.25  
Despite its early origin, by the 1900s greater justification was nevertheless required 
from those legislators who wished to engage in waterworks projects. Specifically, 
politicians had to ensure that the benefits of investing in a riverine facility had to 
outweigh the costs of doing so. To determine the gains and losses of these projects, cost 
benefit analysis (CBA), a conceptual tool developed by economists, was adopted by 
government agencies like the United States Army Corps of Engineers. With this new 
tool, politicians could ostensibly rely upon federal agencies to inform them of potential 
net benefits to their plans. Unfortunately, the information a cost benefit analysis yields is 
primarily fiscal. A CBA is therefore limited in its descriptive power and lacks the ability 
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to provide information that may otherwise prove to be fruitful. Nevertheless, throughout 
the 20th Century cost benefit analysis held great weight in the determination of dam 
construction. 
Today, the sheer numbers behind the state of the American dam are marked. Millions 
of dams now exist within the continental United States, with reservoirs that amount to 
three percent of the country’s total surface area.26 Though most dams are only about a 
meter in height, a significant number reach elevations of hundreds of feet (see Figure 1), 
and many are approaching or have already exceeded their useful lives.27 As of 2012, 
almost a quarter of the nation’s dams were 50 years old and by 2020 this statistic is set to 
reach eighty-five percent.28 With an increase in the age of a dam comes a decrease in its 
marginal utility, resultant from the degradation of structural stability and an increase in 
the sedimentation of its reservoirs.29 
As dams in the United States have matured in age, so too have once fringe 
movements to remove them. So much so that between 1998 and 2001 the World Bank 
and the World Conservation Union saw need to establish the World Commission on 
Dams (WCD) for the purpose of producing a comprehensive report on, among other 
things, the decommissioning of dams and the development of a framework for decisions-
making regarding them.30 According to the WCD report published in 2000, while the 19th 
Century saw a prodigious pattern of dam construction in the United States, “[t]he end of 
the 20th Century saw the emergence of another trend relating to large dams – 
decommissioning dams that no longer serve a useful purpose, are too expensive to 
maintain safely, or have unacceptable levels of impacts in today’s view.” The report goes 
on to point out that since 1998, “the decommissioning rate for large dams has overtaken 
the rate of construction in the United States.”31 Acknowledging the movement in 
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developed countries like the United States to decommission dams, the report offers many 
logistical comments, but most come in the form of a criticism of existing practices.32 
Figure 1: Map of Dams by Height in the United States 
 
Source: National Inventory of Dams, Army Corps of Engineers, 2016, Interactive Maps 
 
Today there is a dearth of methodological approaches to determining the 
decommissioning of dams. Few other practical options have been provided, so that as of 
today, just as cost benefit analysis was the primary tool used in the 20th Century for dam 
commissioning, cost benefit analysis is still presented as the primary strategy for 
determining dam decommissioning.33 According to a report on dam removal from the 
non-profit think tank The Aspen Institute, out current approaches are not enough, instead 
“…a new way of thinking about dams and related problems is needed to make optimal 
decisions.”34 By focusing on the almost 2,300 hydroelectric dams in existence,35 the field 
of biophysical economics can offer one such way of thinking. 
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EROI Analysis 
 
As noted, energy is a vital input to production that is seldom concentrated upon. By 
granting the input greater weight, more detail can be provided in the decision whether to 
allow a hydroelectric dam to remain in commission. The process involved in energy 
estimation is not as complicated as it might seem. By calculating the ratio of energy 
generated from an energy-producing facility over the invested energy of the facility itself, 
a measure of energy-production efficiency can be formed.36 This ratio is called energy 
returns on energy invested analysis or EROI for short. 
Numerous studies have engaged in EROI analysis of energy producing activities,37 
though relatively few have pursued EROI analysis of hydroelectricity. In 2015, Atlason 
and Unnthorsson of the University of Iceland engaged in a comprehensive EROI of the 
Fljotsdalsstod hydroelectric plant in Iceland. They found that over a hundred years, the 
EROI of the plant would be around 110:1.38 The methodology they used in their study 
will be a guiding force for this paper. Others such as Gilliand have made commendable 
estimates of the EROI of small hydroelectric plants at a ratio of 11.2:1.39 More recent 
estimates have been closer to 12:1.40 Most notably, significant figures in the field D.J. 
Murphy and A.S. Hall, have estimated the EROI of a standard hydroelectric dam to be 
above 100:1.41 But these have not even been the most noteworthy estimations. Gagnon et 
al. have calculated EROI estimates of reservoir plants at 205:1 and run-of-river plants at 
267:1,42 extremely high estimations of energy yield.  
The great variety in EROI estimates in the literature serves to illustrate two issues. 
First, that the assumptions and techniques behind EROIs can create an array of results. 
Second, that extracting energy from rivers is a precarious and inconsistent process. 
Because each river is different, the amount of energy each hydroelectric plant produces 
will vary greatly, therein restricting the reliance on a universal hydroelectric EROI ratio. 
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Conveniently, analysts have also demonstrated that dam size need not directly correlate 
to energy production capacity. Notwithstanding, there is little evidence from the literature 
that EROI analysis has been presented as a supplementary tool to cost benefit analysis in 
the decommissioning of dams. Therefore, by engaging in an EROI analysis of a 
significant hydroelectric dam, such as Glen Canyon Dam in northern Arizona, it will be 
shown that energy analysis is a highly useful tool for decision-making, and economics in 
general. But first, an overview of the existing cost benefit methodology and its positive 
and negative attributes must be provided. 
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Chapter 2: Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
In ancient economies, before the development of substantial economic theories such 
as cost benefit analysis, the net economic effects of public works projects would have 
been unknown. Even if the area immediately surrounding a dam were to benefit, this may 
not have been emblematic of an entire region. With time, as economies grew so too did 
the capabilities of dam construction expand with the pace of industrialization. With this 
expansion, the process of damming rivers and tributaries increasingly required greater 
justification. 
In the 19th Century, the eminent economist Jules Dupuit developed the theoretical 
foundation for social welfare maximization. His theories would eventually allow for 
policy makers to rationalize the investment into costly damming projects with his 
economic tools. Using what would come to be known as cost benefit analysis, beginning 
in the early 20th Century the American government began to require that all public works 
projects explicitly weigh their costs and benefits to justify public policy.  
As reliance upon metrics such as cost benefit analysis grew, skepticism arose as to the 
capacity of one metric to illustrate the state of the world. For their part, the United States 
Congress placed their faith in federal agencies like the US Army Corps of Engineers to 
conduct objective assessments of works projects. At the same time, members of the 
federal government were also known to have been critical of the costly nature of those 
federal agencies, despite being beholden to the whims of Congress themselves. 
The controversies behind cost benefit analysis are legion, and are not limited to 
government figures themselves. Over time a variety of economists have attempted to 
reconcile or abolish cost benefit analysis dependent on their inclination. One issue taken 
with cost benefit analysis is the limited nature of its metric. By solely measuring price, 
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cost benefit analysis is unable to describe the world in its entirety. But most individuals 
have not lived in a world without the mechanisms behind cost benefit analysis, and 
therefore do not realize how uncertain project management used to be.  
As with any tool, cost benefit analysis is limited in scope. It has also been abused and 
misused by government figures in the past. But metrics that are used in decision making 
are not necessarily culpable by the actions taken in their name. If anything, this says more 
about the human capacity to forego critical thought in the face of simplified information. 
This realization should not preclude the use of CBA, but it does leave room for other 
metrics, such as energy returns on energy invested analysis to play a supplementary role 
to where cost benefit falters. Before this claim can be demonstrated, however, a proper 
understanding of cost benefit analysis is needed. 
 
Methods 
 
Since its foundation, cost benefit analysis has undergone considerable theoretical 
shifts. Many alterations have been dependent upon need or background of the analyst. 
There is not a strict consensus regarding the inputs into cost benefit analysis, but 
generally economists concern themselves with what might be called the process’s 
“Foundational Principles.”43 Though even these principles are also subject to 
“considerable plasticity,”44 consequently the purpose of this section is to present a 
general outline of cost benefit analysis, adding where pertinent differences of 
perspective.45   
Cost benefit analysis can be summarized through ten different methodological steps: 
the design of a rigorous analytic framework; the determination of relevant costs and 
benefits; the identification and categorization of these costs and benefits; the calculation 
of a work’s costs and benefits over the life of the project; the monetization of costs; the 
  12 
monetization of benefits; the adjustment of costs and benefits according to social discount 
rates; the computation of the Net Present Value (NPV) of costs and benefits; the 
performance of sensitivity analysis; and the composition of a formal recommendation, if 
deemed necessary.46 In the following sections, each of these concepts will be discussed in 
some detail. 
 
The Analytic Framework 
 
The first step of any cost benefit analysis is to properly assess the state of the 
world as it exists before engaging in a project. This “status quo” analysis varies spatially 
and temporally. There are three separate temporal lenses through which a project can be 
assessed: ex ante, in medias res, and ex post—before, during, and after project 
completion, respectively.47 The choice of which lens to use largely depends on the stage 
of the project being analyzed. An ex ante lens is used, for instance, when there is a 
proposal for a project or when there are multiple projects being compared for the same 
space. An in medias res lens can be used to assess the costs and benefits of a project 
already in operation, while an ex post lens is used by those calculating the success of a 
recently completed project, or a for some past project.48 
Analysts do not hold great agency in their choice of project lens. This might be 
perceived as an inherent weakness to the process. An ex ante CBA, for example, 
necessarily must make predictive assumptions about the status quo of a world which does 
not yet exist. 49 In contrast, an ex post CBA has the benefit of hindsight but it can often 
become difficult for analysts to determine if a cost or benefit is applicable to the project 
itself. Still, times limitations are characteristic of most analyses, and there are few 
alternatives to be had.  
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Relevant Costs and Benefits 
 
The ability to distinguish the relevant inputs to a CBA is both crucial and difficult. 
The strict precision by which elements are included in their models necessarily make or 
break the quality of a cost benefit analysis. These variables must be chosen by a critical 
mind and error can be best avoided by the clarity of a project itself, and the explicitness 
of its objectives.50 For example, distinctions must be made between a preexisting road 
used by construction vehicles, and one built strictly to transport the damming materials to 
a river. By properly defining the scope of a cost benefit analysis, these issues can be 
limited. 
Positive and negative externalities are also significant factors in the tracking of costs 
and benefits. According to economist Harold Demsetz, the externality is an “ambiguous 
concept.” Nevertheless, an externality can be thought of as the unintended consequence 
of some action that is not compensated for through internalization. Correspondingly, 
internalization is a compensatory transaction of property or money between one or more 
parties to ameliorate for those unintended consequences.51 Externalities can be positive or 
negative in the same way that pollution is generally a negative consequence of coal fired 
plants, and pleasant scents are positive consequences of living near a chocolate factory. 
To account for externalities, it is essential to be consistent in one’s reasoning. 
According to some scholars, the operators of any project should “…take into account the 
external effects of their actions in so far as they alter the physical production possibilities 
of other producers or the satisfactions that consumers can get from given resources,” 52 
whereas they should not take negative externalities into account if “the sole effect is via 
prices of products or factors.”53 In other words, if the construction of a dam upstream 
requires the dredging of a river downstream, this could be a relevant externality because 
outside actions were forced into consideration. Accounting for relevant externalities can 
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be complicated, and so a good rule of thumb is to maintain one’s focus upon the marginal 
shift in value from products that have arisen because of a new investment, and not with a 
marginal shift in the value of assets that existed prior to the project’s construction.54 For 
these reasons, it is important to properly define the boundaries of a cost benefit analysis. 
 
The Identification of Costs and Benefits 
 
Once the scope of a works project is fully delineated, the next objective is to identify 
all costs and benefits that fit within the boundaries of the analysis. As a central step to 
cost benefit analysis, scholars have spent time categorizing costs and benefit.55  Three are 
pertinent to the understanding of cost benefit analysis: real benefits and costs versus 
transfers, indirect and direct costs, and tangible and intangible costs.56  
Real benefits and costs are the adjusted positive or negative effects incurred by 
society as the result of a work. Transfers, on the other hand, are neutral economic effects 
which merely shift the gross allocation of a society’s resources towards a project.57 The 
difference between these concepts is thought of as a change in level versus shift in rate. 
All the while, direct costs and benefits are all relevant variables which can be directly 
attributed to a project itself. 58  Some examples of these concepts might be that a real cost 
is the dead weight loss upon a society to operate a project,59 a direct cost for a project 
might be the resources used to form a dam, and a transfer might be the taxes used to fund 
the project. Economists also refer to the composition of these concepts as a project’s 
variable and fixed costs.  
Analysts also look to measure indirect costs and benefits, also referred to as 
secondary costs or benefits. Complications in measuring secondary effects can occur if 
produced goods end up unconsumed “…to the extent that market prices fail to reflect 
marginal social costs and benefits.”60 When this occurs it becomes difficult to quantify 
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the value of an unpriced good.61 Additionally, indirect benefits and costs can be offset by 
each. To better understand this situation, imagine that a dam constructed for irrigation 
purposes floods a canyon area, inundating hiking paths traditionally used by backpackers. 
No longer of use, the path has now lost its value to hikers. This loss in value might be 
offset, however, if the lake created by the dam now benefits others who would use it for 
sailing.62  
Finally, tangible and intangible effects are those things which do not fit into the other 
categories. For their part, intangible goods are known to be complex as they are not easily 
or adequately priced. Intangibles manifest as concepts like the aesthetic value of a 
canyon, or the knowledge that Redwood trees exist. They are concepts with certain value, 
but because they are experiential, pricing them can be difficult. For this reason, they are 
often referred to as “…perhaps the most problematic area of cost-benefit analysis.” 
Consequently, it is from the pricing of intangibles that some of the heaviest criticisms of 
the CBA occur.63 So much so that sometimes to avoid criticism analysts err in the 
opposite direction by ignoring or fleetingly referring to those costs and benefits which, in 
isolation, have little effect on the overarching project itself.64 For those who choose to 
ignore intangibles, at issue might be that small costs to some might be large costs to 
others. A dam might inundate a sacred area of immense to a few, for instance, but to the 
many this may not seem a great issue. 
 
Lifetime Costs and Lifetime Benefits 
 
Measuring timeframe boundaries can also be important in cost benefit analysis. Over 
the course of a year some of costs and benefits might only avail themselves to analysts 
run as direct, real, or tangible. But in the span of 100 years, other effects might be more 
likely to reveal themselves,65 although some do not always agree with this argument. 
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Some have asserted that it does not make much of a difference as to the timeframe used 
in an analysis.66 Despite these claims, separate fields have attempted to address the long 
run cost and benefit issue by determining a project’s “useful life.” In the case of a dam, a 
bridge, or any construction project, this might would be considered the amount of time a 
community plans on keeping a work commissioned, or the amount of time before its next 
major permanent or semi-permanent change.67 
 
Monetizing Costs/Monetizing Benefits 
 
Once an analytic framework has been firmly established, after all costs and benefits 
have been clearly identified, and the life of costs and benefits have been reasonably 
bounded, the crucial step of monetizing costs and monetizing benefits should be 
addressed. When approaching costs one must be careful to distinctly calculate three 
types: capital costs, sunk costs, and indirect costs. 
First, capital costs will be defined as the costs of those “[d]urable goods capable of 
producing goods or services over a period of time,” which are distinct from land or 
labor.68 In order to ascertain the cost of a capital, its price is spread out over the term of 
its useful life, and then factored by the rate of depreciation. The opportunity cost to the 
firm is also measured, this time as an interest rate times the undepreciated remainder of 
the asset.69 This process is also referred to as amortization. 
Sunk costs should also be accounted for.70 Defined as the past costs sustained by 
firms, regardless of their current or future obligations,71 the magnitude of sunk costs is 
reliant upon whether the analytic framework is ex ante, in medias res, ex post. 
Additionally, projects can be vulnerable to time-inconsistency problems, otherwise 
known as dynamically inconsistent policy, wherein policies planned to be taken before a 
project become no longer optimal to individuals after-the-fact.72 
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Finally, indirect and intangible costs should be calculated. Sometimes seen as an 
arbitrary set of computations for the analyst to determine, individuals attempting to 
calculate costs have been known to simply multiply their direct costs by 30-60 percent in 
the belief that these are close approximations of indirect costs. This methodology has left 
analysts vulnerable to criticism.73 Some have gone as far as to note that “…this approach 
seldom meets the cause-and-effect criteria desired in accurate cost allocation,” largely 
because “the relative proportion of overhead costs has risen.”74  
As an answer to accusations of ungainly calculations, alternative means of computing 
indirect and intangible cost have been developed such as activity-based costing (ABC). 
Wherein traditionally the measurement of costs relied on the arbitrary addition of a fixed 
proportion of overhead costs onto total production costs, ABC methodology calculates 
fixed costs for each activity within a project. These costs are then associated to specific 
goods or services within the project called “cost objects.” Though this may seem 
complicated, to analysts ABC is still more efficient because it “focuses on accumulating 
costs via activities, whereas traditional cost allocation focuses on accumulating costs 
within functional areas.”75 Proponents of ABC methodology contend its superiority over 
traditional strategies because “…it minimises [sic.] or avoids distortions on product costs 
that might occur from arbitrary allocation of overhead costs.”76 No matter one’s 
perspective on the matter, what is clear is that calculating indirect and intangible effects 
is inherently a difficult matter. The results of these calculations should therefore be taken 
with as bare estimations. To some, however, such calculations must be contested.77 
One method within cost benefit analysis that draws great ire is shadow pricing. A 
compensatory method used to correct distortions in the pricing of nonmarket goods and 
services, values are assigned to public goods and services using prices from comparable 
market products.78 Though shadow pricing seems a reasonable thing to do, economist 
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Ashok Rudra explains the problem some see in it: 
By their very definition, shadow prices are equilibrium prices 
corresponding to activity levels that represent optimal choices with 
respect to every element open to choice. The shadow prices therefore 
reflect optimal choices already made. They cannot therefore be made 
use of in making any further choice.79 
 
Put differently, critics balk at shadow pricing because they argue that similar goods may 
not yield similar prices for parallel projects if they both do not operate within the same 
market. 
Some benefits, such as the benefit of increased productivity or the benefit of time 
efficiency, are intrinsically less controversial. Measured as wage or profit increases, any 
project that involves the installation of capital seeks to achieve productivity benefits.80 
Time savings can also be straightforwardly addressed. Assuming laborers have control 
over their hours, they will only work an extra hour if it is of greater value to them than 
comparable hour of leisure. When an hour of leisure perceived as equal or more valuable 
to an individual than an hour’s worth of wage, time will be spent off work. This concept 
is referred to a labor-leisure tradeoff, and the propensity to trade work time for leisure 
time will increase with an investment of capital to incentivize leisure time.81  
Property value can also be difficult to measure, especially depending on the scope of 
an analysis. For instance, the installation of a public park may seem to yield positive 
benefits to the value of local homes. But money spent on this park, and the subsequent 
values of local homes, may only be indicative of values of homes at a further distance. 
Analysts must then be sure to measure the benefits or costs of property value fluctuations 
only if the scope of their study can determine that demand streaming into communities is 
from outside a local jurisdiction.82 
The issue of property value is reflective of complications related to the valuing of the 
environment itself. Valuing the environment is not only inherently difficult to do, in 
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monetizing the environment economists can erect irreconcilable barriers between 
themselves and environmental ethicists. This can be thought of as a negative externality 
of sorts, since it is more of more concern upon the ethicist than the economist. 
Framing the issue in his own characteristically impassioned manner, the famed 
environmentalist Robert Marshall once addressed this issue as he saw it, complaining, 
“What makes wilderness areas most susceptible to annihilation, is that the arguments in 
favor of roads are direct and concrete, while those against them are subtle and difficult to 
express.”83 While Marshall makes a compelling argument, to an economist it might be 
that those “subtle and difficult” counterarguments are themselves based in economic 
thought. Either way, Marshall’s argument is emblematic of the deep divide between those 
who see greater benefits to monetizing the environment, and those who see greater costs. 
 This divide is not strictly limited to environmentalists, either. Environmental 
economists like Mark Sagoff are also contemptuous of what they perceive as the 
reductionist practices of tools like cost benefit analysis. In line with this thought, Sagoff 
reasons:  
As a citizen, I am concerned with the public interest, rather than my own 
interest; with the good of the community rather than simply the well-being 
of my family. … As a consumer … I concern myself with personal or self-
regarding wants and interests; I pursue the goals I have as an individual. I 
put aside the community-regarding values I take seriously as a citizen, and 
I look out for Number One instead.84 
 
Referred to as the “Sagoff Hypothesis,” Sagoff essentially argues that when it comes to 
choices centered around intangibles like the aesthetic environment, individuals should not 
be considered “consumers” but instead “citizens.”85 Less of an argument about the 
concept of cost benefit than how it is done, Sagoff focuses on the value-laden properties 
of CBA.  
To people like Sagoff, the practices of economists are not objective, but are instead 
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value-laden constructs. In pricing goods, objectivity cannot be achieved for in doing so, 
price becomes the sole measure of worth. For this reason, many environmentalists take 
great issue with monetizing the environment on principle. But by this logic, no metric 
could ever be sufficient, because every measurement must be weighed against some unit. 
If no metric is sought, this would be an argument of futility, as the benefits measurements 
are seen as highly useful in society. Furthermore, few environmentalists go so far as to 
learn how environmental valuation is done. When assessing the benefits an environment 
provides, three forms of benefit can be taken: contingent, optional, and existence 
valuation. 
Contingent valuation is measured from the average responses of survey questions and 
helps to ascertain the common value of a public good such as a national park.86 
Meanwhile, optional valuation is also a useful measure. It is calculated by taking the 
average recreation value of say, a national park and is multiplied by the probability of an 
individual visiting it in the future. The result is the measure of an individual’s willingness 
to pay to keep the option open of some future visit.87 For its part, existence valuation, 
sometimes referred to by the more nonpartisan terminology like “non-use valuation,” is a 
measure of the benefit individuals receive merely by knowing an area exists such as 
Sequoia National Forest.88 As can be imagined, existence value is not easily calculated, 
nor is the assignment of its payment. Like contingent valuation, surveys are seen a good 
means of its ascertainment.89 
After all is said and done in the monetization of costs and benefits, it is important to 
recognize what economist Harvey Rosen dubbed “The Chain Reaction Game.” Taking a 
note from extensive historical precedent,90 Rosen points out that an analyst’s interests can 
influence how costs and benefits become monetarized. All one would need to do is 
double, or even triple count arbitrary benefits or costs to achieve one’s goals. As Rosen 
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sees it, “If enough secondary effects are added to the benefit side, eventually a positive 
present value can be obtained for practically any project.”91 Rosen’s argument is 
important to recognize because it illustrates the capacity for bias that any metric holds, 
not exclusively cost benefit analysis. Rosen’s point does not necessarily dilute the 
usefulness of cost benefit analysis, if anything it simply recognizes the potential 
drawbacks in relying solely upon one metric in the decision-making process. 
 
The Social Discount Rate and Net Present Value 92 
 
Just as entropy depreciates capital, and inflation impacts price, so too are the costs 
and benefits susceptible to diminishing marginal utilities over time. To make up for this 
depreciation, attempts are made to value at present that which does not yet exist. Called a 
“discount rate,” this concept is divided into two categories, private discount rates and 
social discount rates. Private discount rates are indexed at the market, and can therefore 
be affected by the time preferences of consumers. Because governments tend to take into 
greater consideration the well-being of future citizens, social discount rates, which are 
non-market values, are generally used in the long-run.93  
Non-market values such as the social discount rate are complex. In theory, they are 
used to best “reflect society’s impatience or preference for consumption today over 
consumption in the future.” To find them, a choice of interest rate is made by adjusting 
current market interest rates. They are also dependent on geographic location, economic 
climate, and socially perceived need.94 In America, all federal works projects base their 
budgetary results on a social discount rate published within the Circular A-94 produced 
by the Office of Management and Budget.95 
After a social discount rate is decided upon, analysts are therein able to calculate a net 
present value (NPV), which is the aggregate result of adjusted benefits (B) less adjusted 
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costs (C) over a social discount rate (i) greater than one, to the power of a predetermined 
year (useful life).  
Equation 1:   Net  Present  Value = !!!!!!!! ! +   !!!!!!!! ! +⋯   +    !!!!!!!! ! 
If the results of the NPV are positive, then a project is viewed as objectively worthwhile. 
If the NPV yields negative results, the project is not perceived as being worthwhile.96 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
As with any metric, certain assumptions are made in cost benefit analysis. Many of 
these assumptions, and their objections, have been mentioned throughout this brief 
overview. Analysts, however, are not blind to having made these assumptions and often 
challenge them through a test called “sensitivity analysis.” Comparable to the stress tests 
doctor place upon patients to ensure the functionality of their bodily systems, a sensitivity 
analysis is simply a test of the rigor of an analyst’s model. Gauging the robustness of 
their variables, analysts are often compelled to engage in sensitivity analyses for the sake 
of “corroboration, quality assurance, and the defensibility of model-based analysis.”97 
Not always having been the case, this shift towards substantiation is likely the result of 
science’s amplified societal role.98 
The process of a sensitivity analysis is generally a simple one. Once a social discount 
rate has been decided upon and net present value has been reached, the analysts reviews 
their variables, especially those which they assigned more obscure values such as indirect 
costs and benefits. Then, as one analyst puts it: 
The idea is to simply replace unknown or uncertain parameters with 
alternative values drawn from a plausible distribution. Researchers might, 
for example, conduct sensitivity analysis over alternative specifications of 
the discount rate, dose-response relationships, omitted costs/benefits, or 
predictions about future impacts from global climate models. Conclusions 
of any CBA should be explicit about whether the qualitative results are 
sensitive to particular parameters, especially when they are associated with 
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uncertainty, differences of option, or both.99 
 
Put differently, the sensitivity analysis is the procedural equivalent of Marshall’s ceteris 
paribus in that, holding all else constant, variables are marginally shifted to find the 
significance of their contribution to a model. This is an important process to undergo 
since by definition most models take concepts too complex for the mind to hold and 
simplify them.  
Sensitivity analyses are not without their dissenter either. Some scholars hold 
contempt for the process because, as the see it, “[u]nder the best circumstances, [cost 
benefit] models have many degrees of freedom and, with judicious fiddling, can be made 
to produce virtually any desired behavior, often with both plausible structure and 
parameter values.”100 Not unlike the Rosen’s criticism, the critique here is a common one 
leveled at data-driven models: data can be made to say many things. No doubt, this is 
true, and that significance is often misattributed or mislaid.101 Such criticisms do not 
necessarily reflect issues in cost benefit analysis, but in its interpretation. 
Cost benefit analysis is a powerful but limited tool. Like language or a atomized 
energy the use of a tool can have varied effects. It is a tool which simplifies the 
complexity of the world into price, therein sacrificing precision for accuracy. Inarguably, 
this lack of precision is important. It should also be acknowledged that the world of 
decision-making before cost benefit analysis was imprecise, that is presumably why it 
was developed. With the development of metrics like cost benefit came progress and 
complication. It has been the faithful reliance upon cost benefit analysis that has been 
used to help justify decisions and has also forfeit responsibility. Only with addition of a 
further metric can better decisions made from its results be put in check. 
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Ancient Works 
 
Before CBA was ever developed, the practice of dam construction took place over 
millennia. The choice to build them largely relied upon the interpretations of costs and 
benefits from human oversight; in that time their true immediate and regional effects 
remain uncertain. Though it is not known just how long ago they were first designed, 
archaeologists have found evidence of the early Sumerians having begun dam 
construction on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers as far back as 6500 BC.102 Despite the 
imprecise nature of their origin, some economists have associated a close link between 
the erection of more dams by ancient civilizations for the purposes of agriculture, flood 
control, transportation, and water storage, and an increase in their economic growth.103 In 
truth, it is likely that decision-makers of the time also thought that the benefits of their 
projects outweighed the costs. But without having developed a rigorous economic 
framework it would have been hard to have known for certain. In hindsight, it is even 
more difficult to ascertain the value these dams had in ancient nation-building.  
This uncertainty is so acute that today there exists a schism in the archaeological field 
regarding the interpretation of ancient economies. Perspectives vary among scholars as to 
if the past should be taken “as Same (a primitive version of our present, which 
teleologically evolves into it) or as Other (as a remote, alien, fundamentally different 
world.)"104 This divide has led to mistakes at both ends of the spectrum. For their part, 
some economists have made the mistake of applying modern market assumptions and 
ideologies to the past, while many archaeologists have in turn over-corrected for these 
assumptions to the extent that a large portion of their literature “…errs in the opposite 
direction by denying or downplaying commercial institutions and practices in ancient 
states.”105 Despite this circular debate, what seems certain is that because economies of 
the past had few tools of analysis, the results of a works project on an economy would 
  25 
have been largely opaque. Almost paradoxically, it is also evident that some economists 
have been willing to assume the economic benefits of ancient works projects without the 
type of data they are wont to rely upon. Without a framework for determining such 
matters, these assumptions cannot be so lightly made. 
What is clear is that for thousands of years ancient civilizations engaged in works 
projects such as the construction of dams. Without strong data, the net effects of each 
new dam would have been unknown and in isolation. Only as economies developed into 
the 19th Century did knowledge and necessity coalesce to allow geniuses like Jules 
Dupuit to create the foundations of a better metric. 
 
Dupuit’s Brilliant Theories… 
 
The need for an economic metric to determine social cost came about during the 
industrial revolution, a time when the perceived gains of development often trumped the 
costs of human suffering. Laying the groundwork for just such a measurement, the 
eminent 19th Century economist Jules Dupuit, better known for his “consumer surplus” 
theories, is credited as having “rightful claims as the first cost-benefit economist.”106 
Perceived as the mind which produced the “peak achievement” of demand theory, 
historian Jürg Niehans has even gone as far as to quip that, of Dupuit’s many 
accomplishments, “…his contribution to the theory of demand is the only one that shines 
more brilliantly today than when it was made.”107 Though this may well be true, for our 
purposes it is generally how Dupuit’s theories were later applied to the commons that 
becomes most prescient. 
Dupuit’s biography reveals meaning behind his theory’s development. Born in France 
in 1804, Dupuit began his education at the Parisian institution École Polytechnique in 
1822. By 1824 Dupuit was notably enlisted as a civil engineer for the federal 
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Administration of Bridges and Highways of France, eventually earning the title of chief 
engineer. Augmented by a lifelong career in the public sector, the entirety of Dupuit’s 
written academic contributions would remain distinctly focused on the commons.108 True 
to character, as other economists were drawing classical demand curves for private 
goods, “Dupuit drew one for a public good in order to choose the socially best quantity 
and financing of public works.”109 It was Dupuit’s rather selfless focus on public wealth, 
as opposed to what Lauderdale called the scarcity of “private riches,”110 that would direct 
cost benefit analysis towards societal application. 
The path of Dupuit’s theoretical development was twofold. First, Dupuit concerned 
himself with the correction of economic fallacies of general social welfare. To illustrate 
this point, imagine a federally owned dam. Initially, Dupuit noted that the utility of a 
public works project is not discernable from its cost. Put another way, the cost of a dam is 
not necessarily reflective of its inherent usefulness to society—it could simply end up 
being a needlessly expensive dike. Next, Dupuit theorized that the utility of a public work 
cannot be determined by the savings it provides therein. This point is a bit more 
powerful, but remains in the same vein. Once constructed, perhaps a dam reduces annual 
flooding. Though a direct benefit from the construction of the dam, this still does not 
transfer to the use-value of the dam itself. Lastly, according to Dupuit the utility of a 
public work should not be calculated by its increased usage without accounting for 
diminishing marginal utility.111  
Dupuit’s last assertion can be better understood by imagining a dam with a large store 
of water for local agriculture. It happens to also be a particularly dry year, and so farmers 
continually return to siphon water from the its coffers, so that there is not enough time to 
replenish its stock. Dupuit points out that with each gallon of water drawn away from the 
dam, the value of the water increases because it is more economically scarce. Conversely, 
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from a farmer’s perspective, with each gallon of water siphoned, the next gallon of water 
inherently becomes less valuable than the one before it. This concept would later come be 
known as decreasing marginal utility—the keystone of modern microeconomics. 
But Dupuit was not content simply to leave these claims to bare without also offering 
an illustrative means to describe social welfare. His second development would describe 
the effects of diminishing marginal utility upon society by using graphs. To properly 
explain just what Dupuit’s theories were, imagine a town were interested in constructing 
a dam. Normally its townspeople would pay price P for quantity Q of town services, 
leaving them at point S (Figure 2)—the equilibrium point. To build a dam, however, a 
“tax rate” would need to be levied upon the townspeople above price P, reducing the 
quantity demanded to below point Q. 
Figure 2: Dupuit’s Model of “Relative Utility” of Public Works 
 
Source: Niehans, 1990, Dupuit’s Model of Utility, 135 
To come to this conclusion, a few underlying assumptions must have been held. For 
one, it is assumed that at any given price, the marginal utility received from a unit will be 
at least equal to its price. It also must be assumed that an individual will spend a 
  28 
decreased amoung of money per unit. This is diminishing marginal utility, and can be 
understood by the curved line AB. Underneath this line, absolute utility—the aggregate 
utility acquired per unit before tax—is represented to the left of the equilibrium by the 
area confined by points OASQ. According to Dupuit, once demand is limited by the 
levying of a tax—where the demand curve equals the tax price at the dotted line above 
point P—utility is shown to be reduced. This is illustrated by the shaded triangle in 
Figure 2. 
Later explicitly defined as dead weight loss, this shaded triangle rudimentarily 
illustrates an incredibly powerful point shown as never before: the losses which society 
incurs when it adopts a public works project. Not only this, but Dupuit’s graph also 
illustrates through the “tax yield” where the utility society sacrificed for the dam project 
went. For thousands of years projects had been decided by the consideration of relative 
social costs and relative social benefits. Through Dupuit’s work, costs and benefits could 
be rationalized and demonstrated. Said to be one of “…the first clear representations of 
the relationship between total utility and marginal utility,”112 economic historians would 
later reflect that Dupuit’s work produced the first competent metric of societal utility and 
“in the process, supplied the foundations of modern welfare economics.”113 Put no less 
emphatically, scholars would declare that “Dupuit developed a money measure of the 
benefit of public works and of goods in general, thereby forging the most important 
single tool of welfare economics.”114 That tool would eventually form the basis for what 
is now known as cost benefit analysis. For the first time in history, these costs and 
benefits could be sufficiently measured.  
Unfortunately, Dupuit would have no control on how these results would be 
interpreted. Though his theories were extraordinary and brought about considerations as 
never before, many would not consider the metaphorical nature of his findings. In other 
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words, many would adopt cost benefit analysis on faith alone, often because they had an 
incentive to do so, and use its findings as the primary justification for the damming of 
American rivers and tributaries.115 
 
Cost Benefit Analysis: An American History 
 
Initially, societies did not have reasonable measures to determine choice efficiency. 
In hindsight, this may have left the them vulnerable to interpretation based on flawed 
logic when it came to determining the net effects of works projects. Finally, civil-
engineer-turned-economist Jules Dupuit worked out a means to understand social welfare 
maximization, forever changing how to determine public choice. At last, cost benefit 
analysis could provide substantiated reasoning as to why certain works projects could or 
could not be made. It did not, however, preclude individuals from interpreting its findings 
as illustrative of the world itself. What they could not see is that, as a measurement 
attempts to present data precisely, it sacrifices its ability to explain it accurately, and vice 
versa. In other words, cost benefit analysis tells a story in its own way. It cannot explain 
the world itself, and it, like all other tools, is limited.  
Historically, the flaw in cost benefit analysis has been in the narrowness of scope. 
More explicitly, by measuring costs and benefits through price, all pertinent information 
becomes contingent upon price. This is not to say that price is the wrong metric, nor that 
CBA is not a worthwhile endeavor, it is instead to say that those interpreting the results 
of CBA must approach it with the understanding that price is not the only metric worth 
noting. 
In 20th Century America, where government expenditures for works projects would 
drastically increase, price may well have been falsely taken as the sole measure of 
concern for policy makers. As such, a relatively brief explanation of cost-benefit’s 
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historical usage in the United States will shed light upon the US Congress, who had the 
incentive to rely upon it to justify their decisions, and the US Army Corps of Engineers, 
which had an incentive tweak its numbers. By this explanation’s end, it will become clear 
that cost benefit alone should no longer be the only option in the decision to commission 
or decommission dams. 
 
CBA and Legislation 
 
Though its foundations lay with Dupuit, the ideology of cost benefit analysis has a 
long association with America. In 1772 the statesman and Founding Father Benjamin 
Franklin wrote about his own version of cost benefit analysis in the decision-making 
process, writing: 
When difficult cases occur, they are difficult chiefly because while we 
have them under consideration, all the reasons pro and con are not present 
to the mind at the same time … To get over this, my way is to divide half 
a sheet of paper by a line into two columns; writing over the one “Pro”, 
and the other “Con”. Then … I put down under the different heads short 
hints of the different motives … for and against the measure … I 
endeavour [sic.] to estimate their respective weights; where I find one on 
each side that seem equal, I strike them both out. If I find a reason pro 
equal to two reasons con, I strike out three … and thus proceeding I find at 
length where the balance lies … And, though the weight of reasons cannot 
be taken with the precision of algebraic quantities, yet when each is thus 
considered, separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I 
think I can judge better, and am less liable to take a rash step.116 
 
The depth of Franklin’s reflection is astounding. First, he notes just why measuring costs 
and benefits can be useful, pointing out that there is an inherent inability for humans to 
simultaneously account for all positive and negative effects of a decision. He also 
inadvertently points to intrinsic issues of the process as well; in that he chooses his own 
weight of each effect. Though this is his right, it is nevertheless analogous to some of the 
criticisms the tool receives.  
The first modern instance of the language of costs and benefits within legislation 
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began with the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1902. It was not until 1920, however, that calls 
were explicitly made for the benefits of a works project to exceed the costs.117 Whereas 
prior to 1920 it was simply socially assumed that a project’s costs was not to exceed its 
benefits, it had now become established principle. Stanford economist Richard Hammond 
described the implications of this matter with nuance, explaining: 
The computation of benefit-cost ratios was intended to serve two purposes 
which in essence are separate. It establishes which public projects are 
prima facie likely to yield economic benefits and are hence worthy to be 
submitted for congressional approval; and it furnishes a basis for the 
apportionment of the cost of such projects between the federal government 
and others. In the first case, it embodies an economic shibboleth, in the 
form of a benefit-cost ratio in excess of 1:1; in the second, it lays down a 
rubric that the apportionment of costs should be in the same ratio as the 
incidence of benefits. Neither shibboleth nor rubric is in fact binding on 
Congress, and each is essentially no more than a rule of thumb for the 
guidance of government agencies in submitting projects. 118 
 
In other words, the adoption of cost benefit analysis was meant to exclude expensive 
projects, and to equally include both benefits and costs into consideration. Specifically, if 
benefits outweigh the costs by a ratio of more than 1-to-1, then it was thought that, 
objectively speaking, a works project should be pursued. Markedly, Hammond also 
mentions that such legislation was meant as a rule of thumb for Congress. The notion of 
CBA as a guiding force for Congress is perhaps his most prescient point. 
It was in 1936, amid the New Deal Era, that the Federal Navigation Act was passed in 
Congress. Like its predecessors, the Act’s significance would lie in the precedent it 
would set regarding how works projects would be chosen in the United States. Expressly 
affirming the responsibility of the federal government to finance flood control projects, 
the language of the Act reasoned that all projects should be taken up “if the benefits to 
whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and 
social security of people are otherwise adversely affected.”119 The expressed reason for 
the Act’s establishment was to “bring the maximum feasible economic benefit to a nation 
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that needed badly to recover from the Great Depression.” In actuality, the passage of the 
Act of 1936 was more illustrative of just how badly “water-development projects had 
already become notorious for pork barrel scrambles.”120  
By this point, despite cost benefit language already existing as a “guiding force” for 
the nation, the federal government managed to overexert itself. Some scholars reflecting 
on the influence of CBA at the time have gone as far as to say that the “American 
Practice” of cost benefit analysis was nothing more than “window dressing for projects 
whose plans have already been formulated with little if any reference to economic 
criteria.”121 Of Congress, which interpreted the analyses, and the US Army Corps of 
Engineers, which conducted them, scholars are “doubtful”  that either entity “explicitly 
commanded any formal appreciation of economic theories of consumer surplus.”122 
Despite their lack of appreciation for economics, initiatives like the Central Valley 
Project and agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority were able to receive ample 
funding.123 
Over their lifetimes initiatives like the Central Valley Project and its agencies such as 
the Tennessee Valley Authority would be apportioned billions of dollars to engage in 
works projects.124 It is no coincidence that the increase in the propensity of these projects 
was correlated to language that asserted benefits were outstripping costs. According to 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1935 which legislated these funds, all works projects were 
“in accordance with the plans recommended in the respective reports” by the US Army 
Corps of Engineers.125 As it turned out, the Corps had an intimate history with cost 
benefit analysis and in requesting great amounts of government funds. 
The Corps was the manifestation of yet another French civil engineer, Pierre 
L’Enfant.126 Referred to as the “political godfather of cost benefit analysis in the United 
States,”127 The Corps of Engineers had not always been quite proficient in the eyes of 
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Congress when it came to cost estimates. In the 1820s, the Corps had been assigned to 
survey the path of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canals. Bringing back a figure of $22 
million to Washington, three times what it took to build the Erie Canal, it is said that 
“Congress rebelled and brought in some practical men, who duly reduced the figure by 
half.”128 Congress never stopped relying upon the Corps for their analyses, however, and 
over a century and a half later, L’Enfant’s Corps would hold a presence in United States 
politics he likely could not have imagined.  
Commenting on the Corps in 1950, Harold L. Ickes, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Secretary of the Interior, wrote: 
One way to describe the Corps of Army Engineers would be to say that it 
is the most powerful and most pervasive lobby in Washington. The 
aristocrats who constitute it are our highest ruling class. They are not only 
the political elite of the army, they are the perfect flower of bureaucracy. 
… Within the fields that they have elected to occupy they are the law—
and therefore are above the law.129 
 
Of their use of public funds, it appeared they were seen in no better light. That same year 
the Chairman of House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon 
of Mississippi complained, “The Chief of Engineers has committed the Government and 
is continuing to commit the Government to the expenditure of funds far in excess of 
amounts contemplated by the Congress.” Senator Paul Douglas, a former professor of 
economics at the University of Chicago described as “customarily one of the most 
courteous men,” tersely exclaimed, “They [the Army Corps of Engineers] become the 
Congress of the United States.”130 More than any previous comment, Douglas’ assertion 
that the Corps reflected the United States Congress was most accurate. 
If government employees held such disdain for the Corps, why rely on them? After 
all, cost benefit analysis was supposed to be a guideline. Congress relied on cost benefit 
analysis beyond just its usefulness, they also embraced it despite the lack of their 
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economic understanding because it allowed them to shift responsibility to the Corps. 
Essentially, the propagation of cost benefit analysis was not only the result of its use by 
the Corps of Engineers, it was also endogenously related to the incentives upon Congress. 
Theodore Porter, a Professor of Scientific History at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, points out that “[g]rowing budgets due to flood control acts of 1917 and 1928, 
the latter in response to the exceptional Mississippi River floods of 1927, created pressure 
for greater accountability.”131 And just as Congress had an incentive rely on the Corps, 
the Corps had an incentive to operate in patriotic obscurity. 
During a discussion of the flood Mississippi floods of 1927, one witness spoke of the 
political pressure the Corps was facing. In a state of feigned shock, Representative 
William Norrell of Arkansas pressed the witness further, “Do you mean to tell this 
committee that the Army of Engineers are susceptible to political pressure and 
influence?” To which the witness flatly denied having said any such thing. Satiated, 
Norrell added, “I just want to get it clear in the record that you didn’t mean that public 
political influence could be brought to bear upon the Army Engineers and further that 
they are always guided solely by the technical field in which they operate.”132 In another 
textbook example, Senator Prescott Bush of the 1954 Senate Flood Control 
Subcommittee learned that the local benefits of a works project were estimated at around 
$22,500. As his witness explained to him, “[the number] is calculated according to a 
rather complex formula. I won’t worry you with the details of that formula.” “All right,” 
was Senator Bush’s response.133 
The US Congress was able to simultaneously distance themselves from their 
decisions by upholding the Army Corps of Engineers. Senator Royal Copeland of New 
York, the man who was responsible for the insertion of the cost-benefit provision into the 
Flood Control Act of 1936, called the Corps “honorable, straightforward, patriotic men.” 
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Representative William Whittington of the House asserted in 1936 that “the chief of 
engineers is impartial and represents Congress and the country.” Finally, Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg in the same year unabashedly noted that the system of cost benefits required 
“an independent, nonpolitical, unprejudiced decision as to priorities,” going as far as to 
claim that “no one has ever heard a suspicion or a remote challenge” regarding the 
integrity and competence of the Board of Engineers.”134  
Almost predictably, these character assessments were far off base. Instead of 
objectivity and patriotism, the Corps was more often concerned with, and indeed had far 
more practical interest in the “perpetual effort to push back the frontiers of cost-benefit 
analysis so that there would always be a manageable supply of economically approved 
projects.”135 So much so that by the mid-1950s the Corps of Engineers 
uncharacteristically began to enlist economists “to quantify an ever more diverse and 
recalcitrant array of benefits.”136 It may be no coincidence that construction dams in the 
United States peaked between 1955 and 1975.137 
 But in bringing in economists to play a lead role where once they merely held an 
aside, argues Hammond, this may have brought the downfall of cost benefit analysis. For 
Adam and Eve felt temptation even before “the economic serpent” enticed them with the 
apple. 138 Accordingly, Hammond meditated on the process of the economists, cost 
benefit analysis, and politics, stating:   
There seems to have been a dialectical process at work, in which the growth 
of the federal government’s economic power and influence has been matched 
by that of the already endemic suspicion of politicians and bureaucrats, and 
both have operated to exalt a supposedly scientific approach to decision-
making. … For this very reason, some have sought to deny to economics the 
title of science. “A scientific law,” says the biologist Lancelot Hogben, 
“embodies a recipe for doing something, and its final validification rests in the 
domain of action.” By contrast, “economics, as it is studied in our universities, 
is the astrology of the machine age.” … To say this is to call upon 
[economists] to recognize that their discipline has more in common with 
philosophy than it has with natural science. Hence there is only superficial 
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likeness between the findings of benefit-cost analysis and, say, an engineer’s 
calculation of the safe load a bridge will carry.139 
 
Put another way, like many, Hammond is critical of the integration and reliance upon cost 
benefit analysis because of its lack of objective scientific worth. But this reasoning is 
flawed in that he makes the wrong conclusion from the right assumptions. Yes, 
economics is not strictly scientific. Anyone who argues it is likely has an incentive to do 
so, such as the US Army Corps of Engineers or Congress. But economists, though 
flawed, do not generally argue this as the case. Economics is a social science. Cost 
benefit analysis is an imprecise tool to be used to augment the decision-making process, 
not control it. Over the course of the 20th Century, this tool was coopted by those in the 
federal government to better justify the creation of dams. Interpretations of CBAs should 
not be taken as law but as indication, though it is understandable why such mistakes 
occurred. 
 The flaw in cost benefit analysis, especially to those who do not wish to 
understand its nuance, is that it can only measure the world through pricing mechanisms. 
Though helpful, viewing the world solely through this lens will corrupt one’s vision. Cost 
benefit analysis allows for decisions to be made by the simplification of the world 
through one metaphorical metric. Since there had been no alternative metrics to the 
decision-making process, CBA had to do. Today, new methods exist for the examination 
of certain works projects like hydroelectric dams. By adding an array metrics to the 
decision-making process, by allowing for supplementary metrics such as energy returns 
on energy invested (EROI) analysis to be used, decisions makers will no longer be 
limited viewing the world through a single lens. Greater information can be gathered, and 
more efficient decisions made. Understanding just how EROI analysis works is key to 
comprehending its capabilities.  
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Chapter 3: Energy Returns on Investment (EROI) 
 
In Chapter 2, the method and history of the CBA was discussed. It was then argued 
that by solely relying upon cost benefit analysis, bias is created through its use. Only with 
the addition of separate measures such as energy returns from energy invested, can such 
biases be tempered. Including more objective physical standards such as exergy (the 
maximum work energy can provide) and emergy (the amount of energy of one form 
required to transform into another), EROI studies can provide a more complete 
assessment to the decision-making process than the use of cost benefit analyses alone. 
Specifically, EROI can expand upon the narrow valuation of pricing by observing energy 
inputs and outputs. By supplementing cost benefit analysis with approach from the 
natural sciences, analysts using EROI can add more complete information to the 
decisions behind the commissioning (and decommissioning) of works projects. 
 
 
Similarities and Differences 
 
The output of an EROI is not unlike that of the cost benefit analysis. An EROI study, 
or “Net Energy Analysis,” also provides a numerical index which can contrast simply 
with other comparable calculations.140 Additionally, an EROI analysis will yield a ratio 
not dissimilar to the CBA. Still, where the CBA weighs costs over benefits, the EROI 
weighs objective energy yields, forming a schism between the measures. The EROI also 
succeeds in its ability not only just to quantify energy units, but also to gauge energy 
quality—where energy quality is defined as the ability of a heat unit to generate 
economic output.141 Energy quality can be measured over time to assess how the 
efficiency of energy production changes using time-series data sets.142 An invaluable 
tool, some analyses have used energy quality to demonstrate that oil and gas EROIs have 
decreased from greater than 100:1 in 1930 to 11-18:1 in 2005.143 What these findings 
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illustrate is that a declining EROI over time requires a greater proportion of society’s 
economic potential to be directed at energy procurement, at maintaining the status quo; 
energy that could be concentrated on economic production.144 Ultimately, EROI 
measurements are therefore potent in their explanatory power in a different way than a 
CBA.  
 
EROI Methodology 
 
EROI measurements are a relatively new tool. Consequently, analysts run the risk of 
using EROI inconsistently and incomprehensively in otherwise similar studies, leaving 
their results subject to scrutiny.145 Cognizant of this risk, within the last two decades there 
has been a concerted effort by academics to standardize the methods of EROI analysis. 
As it stands, there are six main steps to EROI analysis: the statement of objective; the 
identification of system boundaries and creation of flow diagrams; the explication of 
system inputs and outputs; the determination of EROI type; the calculation of EROI; and 
energy quality adjustment.146 While some steps to EROI analysis are akin to steps within 
a CBA analysis, a clear distinction between the two will become evident after an 
explanation of each of the following stages. 
 
State objectives 
 
As with any scientific analysis, the first step of an EROI is to clearly express the 
objectives of the analysis.147 Solar panels are becoming ever-more viable options to 
power nations. A worthwhile EROI study might seek, for example, to determine if 
innovations in photovoltaic cell (PVC) technology yield greater efficiencies to power 
generation. 
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Identification of system boundaries and creation of flow diagrams 
 
The system boundary is perhaps the most precarious choice the analyst faces when 
conducting an EROI assessment. Its careful delineation is therefore a crucial undertaking. 
The system boundary is the methodological choice an analyst makes to limit the scope of 
their study. Still, in researching a topic as pervasive as energy, the consistent bounding of 
an analysis can be difficult. For instance, otherwise similar studies on the EROI of corn 
ethanol have been “incommensurable” as a result of the spectrum of different boundaries 
analysts applied to each.148 
The variance in boundaries applied to similar systems stems from differing opinions 
of what counts as energy outputs and what counts as production inputs in an “energy 
chain.”149 An energy chain, the conceptual cousin of a food chain, is the system of all 
stages involved in the production of energy.150 Energy chains are not in isolation, but are 
instead tiers of the entire biophysical energy-economy, as depicted by Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: A Generalized Flow-Model of a Biophysical Energy-Economy. 
 
Source: Murphy, Hall, et al. (2011), Figure 1: 1891 
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The biophysical energy-economy is a macroeconomic circular flow model which 
places greater emphasis on an economy’s reliance upon the sun and the Earth’s metabolic 
processes. The sun acts as the major energy catalyst to all economic activities, with bio-
geo-chemical reactions playing a significant supporting role in the formation of an 
economy’s energy resources, “Q”. To acquire energy, energy chains are needed. Energy 
chains are split into three system boundaries. These three stages are: Boundary 1—the 
extraction of energy (“mine-mouth”); Boundary 2—its processing (“refinery gate”); 
Boundary 3—its distribution (“final demand”).151 These stages form the energy chain of 
the overall biophysical energy-economy. 
Within this model, four economic sectors comprise the economy: Industrial, 
Residential/Commercial, Transportation, and Public Sector. Within each step, entropy 
siphons off a portion of energy from the model. Environmental services help recycle 
some waste back into the process. Each stage and sector has the potential to be bounded 
within an analysis. Once explicitly included, these bounds form the numerator of an 
EROI ratio.152  
The denominator of the EROI represents the production inputs of an analysis. An 
illustrated flow chart such as Figure 4 helps in understanding these ideas. With each 
additional “Level” of inputs studied, the scope of the assessment becomes larger. A Level 
1 analysis accounts only for the energy inputs directly investigated in a study, whereas 
Level 2 includes the energy inputs from the entire energy sector. The energy required for 
the material inputs necessary in an energy chain are in Level 3. Level 4 incorporates the 
energy required from labor, and Level 5 includes “auxiliary” benefits from other 
economic services such as the creation and maintenance of railroads to transport coal.153 
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Figure 2: Levels of Production Inputs Involved in the Acquisition of Energy.  
 
Source: Murphy, Hall, et al. (2011), Figure 2: 1891 
Figure 4 illustrates the bounds of demarcation required of every EROI analysis. 
Influenced by the eminent scholar of ecosystem analysis, Howard Odum and his students, 
flow diagrams serve multiple purposes.154 In particular, if an analyst cannot demonstrate 
in graphic form the process of their theoretical assessment, then it stands to reason that 
their ideas remain opaque and must be further clarified. Pictures also help in clarifying 
inherently abstract thought. For example, Figure 5 nicely illustrates the “parallel” 
boundaries inherent in the procurement of energy from oil.  
Figure 3: Various Types of EROI Analyses and the Loss of Energy in their 
Transformation from Extracted to Processed and Distributed Fuels. 
 
Source: Hall (2015), Figure 1: 10 
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Beginning arbitrarily with 100 megajoules (MJ) of potential energy in an oil well, 
Figure 5 depicts that each bounded step of the energy gathering process contains entropy. 
From extraction to distribution, it can be seen that 42MJ of energy have already been lost. 
Notably, one can also see the underlying assumptions such a study makes. Namely, the 
additional boundary of “Infrastructure for Transport” is added, which significantly 
reduces the efficiency of oil-based energy systems. Such a boundary represents a Level 5 
“Auxiliary,” in that this EROI system includes beneficial economic services that are not 
directly built to procure oil. 
In addition to the proper placement of system boundaries, an energy assessment 
requires the elucidation of “energy flows”—the process of how energy is brought into 
and used by a society.155 Three techniques are used in the assessment energy flows. 
Process energy analysis, otherwise known as bottom-up analysis, is the most 
straightforward means of assessing “embodied energy”—the total energy needed to 
provide a good or service.156 Process energy analysis directly accounts for all energy used 
in the first two levels of an energy chain.157 If further input levels are sought after, 
economic input-output analysis, also referred to as top-down analysis, is undertaken. 
Economic input-output analysis functions by using sector specific “energy intensity” 
units to factor common economic input-output tables into energy calculation.158 
Specifically, energy intensity units are standardized energy estimates for common 
material goods such as the amount of energy it takes to cool a living space or to transport 
people certain distances. 159 A hybrid version of the two analyses also exists, though it is 
not often used.160 
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Explication of Inputs and Outputs 
 
Once a technique is chosen, all its inputs and outputs should be listed and 
described.161 The choice of inputs and outputs relies significantly upon the boundaries of 
the energy output (the numerator) and the level of production inputs (the denominator). 
Generally, energy output is easier to discern than production inputs since outputs are 
generally narrowed by the system boundary already applied to them. For instance, if a 
researcher chose a “mine-mouth” study limited to a Level 3-material consumption 
analysis, it would be inconsistent to account for, say, the amount of jet fuel processed 
from a well. A mine-mouth study only accounts for extracted crude resources, after all. 
Factoring for the inputs which apply to the extraction of resources can be far more 
complex. Inputs can take the form of energy and materials. Further complicating the 
matter, energy and material inputs can be consumed directly and indirectly. At its 
simplest, there are four types of inputs that go into energy flows, as can be seen in Figure 
6: direct energy—the energy required for economic agents to perform a primary task; 
indirect energy—the energy used in the preparation or augmentation of a separate and 
primary task, or any energy not considered to be direct energy; direct use—the embodied 
energy of material inputs used to perform primary tasks; and indirect use—the embodied 
energy of materials not directly used to perform primary tasks.162  
Notably inputs such as labor hold the potential to be both direct and indirect. Direct 
energy from labor is easy enough to understand; miners extracting bituminous coal in 
Appalachia is one example. Meanwhile, indirect energy comes from the labor needed to 
create the pickaxes those miners might use to gather coal.163 Most studies will include 
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Figure 4: Direct and Indirect Energy and Material Use 
 
 
both direct and indirect energy and material use. It has become customary, therefore, to 
label all “standard EROI” assessments as EROIstnd.164 
Externalities not accounted for in market prices, such as the burning of diesel fuel for 
direct energy, should also be considered. None of the aforementioned analyses, however, 
hold the capacity to measure externalities. Facing this same issue in the 1970s, systems 
analyst Howard Odum attempted to utilize energy’s ubiquity to measure the effects that 
goods or services might have upon the biosphere. By calculating the energy required to 
transform energy and materials from one form to another, such as the amount needed to 
convert diesel fuel into work and greenhouse gases, Odum found a way. Dubbed 
“emergy” by one of his students, Odum’s method relied on standardized estimates of the 
total energy used to perform work in the generation of a good or product.165 Dividing the 
total energy used in a process (emergy) by its embodied energy would create a so-called 
ratio of “transformity.”166 In noting the difference between emergy and energy yield, the 
transformity ratio can be used to factor in previously unaccounted for externalities. 
To be sure, time also plays a role in EROI analysis, as nicely illustrated by Figure 7. 
First, recall that energy flow is how energy is brought into society. Energy flows can be 
provided by oil rigs, windmills, or dams. To build any energy generating facility itself 
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requires energy, where Ec equals the total energy required to build a facility. Between the 
time of its foundation and completion, facilities take time tc to construct. Further, it is 
assumed that energy use is constant 𝐸!.167 Altogether, the energy flow to construction is 
represented by the orange section in Figure 7, and by the equation: 
Equation 2: 168               𝐸! = !!!!  
Once a works project begins to produce energy, it is assumed that its gross rate of 
energy production is constant at 𝐸! for its useful life tL. In addition, a certain amount of 
power is required both to operate an energy facility 𝐸!" and to eventually decommission 
it 𝐸!.169 
The net energy output 𝐸!"# a facility produces in its lifetime is what remains after 
subtracting from a facility’s gross energy output the energy it took to construct, operate, 
and decommission it (see equation 3).170 
Equation 3: 171   𝐸!"# =   𝐸! − 𝐸! − 𝐸!" − 𝐸! 
 
Figure 5: Direct and Indirect Energy Inputs/Outputs Over Time 
 
Source: Murphy, Hall, et al (2011), Figure 4: 1894 
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With these numbers, it is possible to calculate facility’s lifetime energy return on 
investment (EROI), where the numerator (energy output) is gross energy and the 
denominator (production inputs) is the total energy that went into project (see Equation 
4). 172 
Equation 4: 173    𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼 = !!!!!!!"!!! 
 
Determination of EROI Type 
 
Not all EROI studies are the same. EROIstnd has already been presented as the most 
common EROI calculation. More formally, it can be written as: 
 
Equation 5: 174  𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼!"#$ = !"#$%&  !"#$!%"&  !"  !"#$%&'!"#$%&  !"#  !"#!$%&'  !"!#$%  !"#$%!"&  !"#  !"!#$%    !"#$%&#'()  
 
Because EROIstnd is limited to the Boundary 1, mine-mouth, it is seen as the most 
necessary and least controversial EROI. Beyond this bound, assessments become 
vulnerable to more criticism.175 Still, analysts may wish to for further the scope of their 
assessment nonetheless. In addition to the standard EROI, a point of use EROI 
(EROIPOU) may be used to analyze the processing and delivery of energy. EROIPOU 
expands upon EROIstnd in that it can include Boundary 2, refinery gate, and Boundary 3, 
final demand. Recall that in calculating an EROIPOU, the efficiency of an energy chain is 
inherently lessened.176 The refinement and transportation of fuels both expend energy and 
are necessary stages in an energy flow. 
Two more commonplace EROIs exist. The extended EROI (EROIEXT) measures the 
minimal EROI required to use some energy resources. For example, during the 1800s 
EROIEXT might have be beneficial in estimating how much energy it took to process 
whale oil into useful energy. Meanwhile measurements such as societal EROI (EROISOC) 
remain purely hypothetical. In theory, it would calculate the EROI of a whole society’s 
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energy use. Measurements such as EROISOC could be useful in comparing how much 
energy a society requires over time to maintain its economy. According to systems 
ecologist Charles Hall, the preeminent scholar on the EROI, “this calculation has yet to 
be undertaken because it is difficult, if not impossible, to include all the variables 
necessary to generate an all-encompassing EROI value.”177 In other words, any EROI 
measurement can at the very least be theorized. However, with every step taken towards 
comprehension, precision is sacrificed. At a certain point, such as with an EROISOC the 
complexity and scope becomes next to impossible. 
 
Calculation of EROI 
 
The calculation of an EROI will be as easy or difficult as an analyst’s access to 
applicable data. Quantifying the numerator (energy output) for an EROI is not generally 
difficult; many production facilities report their gross energy output on their websites. 
Energy production reports should be cross-referenced, however, as there has been 
occasion for suppliers to overstate their output.178 Governments also provide sectoral data 
on energy-use from which to estimate EROIs. 179 
To calculate the denominator (production inputs) process energy analysis is used. For 
foundational materials, such as wood, steel, concrete, and brick, input calculation can be 
relatively straightforward. 180 Standardized energy estimates already exist for these 
materials.181 To calculate machinery and other non-standardized inputs the economic 
input-output analysis is most beneficial. Finally, one could multiply energy intensity units 
by the expenditures of non-standardized goods and services to achieve a rough 
production input estimate. This technique is most successfully used for industry-wide 
analyses.182 
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Energy Quality 
 
Once calculated, EROI analyses must adjust for “energy quality.” A prominent 
definition of energy quality is the “relative economic usefulness per heat equivalent (as 
measured in joules) of different types of fuels.” 183 Energy quality is more than joule 
yield, however. According to Hall, “Energy quality is determined by a complex set of 
attributes unique to each fuel, such as physical scarcity, capacity to do useful work, 
energy density, cleanliness, amenability to storage, safety, flexibility of use, cost of 
conversion, and so on.”184 In other words, some types of energy have physical and 
intangible traits that are more attractive to society than others. For example, electricity is 
of a higher quality than whale oil due to its ease of use and wide-ranging applicability. 
For the very reason of their distinguishing characteristics, a common criticism of the 
EROI is that it does not account for energy quality. 185  
Two major methods exist to adjust for quality. One is the price-based method of 
adjustment. Using neoclassical economics, the analyst assumes what the economist 
assumes, that price accounts for all the factors mentioned by Hall involved in determining 
energy quality. The price per joule of coal is lower than the price per joule of electricity 
because coal is of lesser energetic quality than electricity and therefore costs less.186  
Still, there are pitfalls to the price-based method. For one, many social and 
environmental costs are not included in the pricing of fuels.187 A more objective 
measurement would be the use of exergy analysis.188 Exergy is defined as the optimum 
amount of useful work a system can perform when in thermodynamic equilibrium.189 
According to a survey of EROI methodology by David Murphy of Northern Illinois 
University, “As work is performed exergy is consumed until a point is reached at which 
the system under study has equilibrated with a reference state.” 190 A reference state is the 
most stable an element can be under its condition.191 Put differently, by calculating 
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exergy EROI analyses of different fuels can be compared. Like any metric, the 
measurement of exergy is limited because as it cannot measure capital and labor 
inputs.192 
  
The Result 
 
The result of a quality-adjusted EROI is a ratio that can indicate the efficiency of an 
energy flow to society. A time-adjusted EROI, moreover, will indicate to analysts the 
marginal increase or decrease in efficiency of a works project. Holding other factors 
constant, as technological innovation occurs EROIs will become greater, indicating more 
efficient energy chains. As studies on the EROI on biofuels and shale have shown the 
converse is also true.193 But as of this writing, few if any EROI studies have been done on 
the hydroelectric efficiency of dams. Such a study could prove to be useful in choosing 
whether or not to decommission such structures. 
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Chapter 4: The EROI of Glen Canyon Dam 
 
Picture 1: The Painting Glen Canyon Dam by Iconic American Artist Norman Rockwell. 
 
The painting depicts a bald eagle, an osprey, one horse, one dog, and three people 
(purportedly of Navajo Indian descent) staring down at the looming structure below. 
According to environmental historian Robin Kelsey, Rockwell’s piece alludes to the 
sublime landscape paintings of the Hudson River School by contrasting environmental 
awe with American ingenuity, forming the “industrial sublime.”194 
Source: United States Bureau of Reclamation, Glen Canyon Dam by Norman Rockwell, 
commissioned 1969, Oil on Canvas 56” x 77” 
 
Introduction 
 
So far, the factors involved in conducting cost benefit analysis have been covered. Its 
brief history and development was explained, and the argument was made that policy 
makers should not solely rely upon CBA to inform their decisions. Next a supplementary 
method to CBA was offered called energy returns on energy invested (EROI) that is 
useful in providing information on the efficiency of energy projects. In this chapter, a 
rough EROI estimate on the energy production at the Glen Canyon hydroelectric dam 
will be made. The express goal of this application will be to demonstrate the benefit of 
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conducting EROI analysis as a supplementary tool to cost benefit analysis. By using a 
dashboard of metrics, a clearer understanding of the costs, benefits, and efficiencies of 
dams like Glen Canyon can be established. In gathering this information, more informed 
decisions can be made in the choice of dam decommissioning.  
 
Choice of Assessment 
 
Three criteria were to determine which dam to conduct an EROI upon. First, dams for 
appraisal were narrowed down to those with hydroelectric capabilities.195 According to 
one estimate, there are approximately 2,540 hydropower dams operating in the United 
States today, almost 95% of which are privately owned.196 Despite the comparatively 
meager percentage of hydroelectric dams which are publically owned, (5%), a majority of 
the nation’s hydroelectric production, (roughly 73%), is derived from them.197 Because 
public facilities produce far more hydroelectricity, it was deemed important to study a 
publically run energy-facility. 
Potential assessments were further filtered to account only for those facilities that 
faced significant public support for decommissioning. Of course, the very nature of dams 
is such that there will likely always exist dissenters. Still, over the last two decades there 
has been a distinct push by dam removal activists to “free the rivers!” and retire 
increasingly larger dams, a movement unlike that which has been previously seen.198 
Some dams have received a notable concentration of criticism, such as the four dams 
along 400 miles of the Klamath River which span between California and Oregon which 
are now slated for decommission by 2020.199 Due to the unique momentum behind the 
movement to retire dams, it seemed appropriate to assess a dam already under pressure to 
be decommissioned. 
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Finally, potential sites of assessment must have previously undergone a cost benefit 
analysis. As the objective of this thesis is not to reinvent the wheel but to improve upon 
it, a preexisting cost benefit analysis was perceived as a significant precursor to 
conducting a hydroelectric EROI. For these reasons, which are amplified by its historical 
and cultural significance, Glen Canyon Dam was chosen for theoretical assessment. 
 
Glen Canyon Dam: A Brief History 
 
Like many major works projects of the West, the Glen Canyon Dam was the product 
of a federal movement to internalize water-related inefficiencies.200 Though these 
inefficiencies stem from numerous factors, water deficiencies in the West are primarily 
spatial in nature; aggregate water supply is greatly affected by a state’s proximity to a 
longitudinal “100th Meridian” marker that splits the nation [see Map 1].201 Whereas states 
to the east of the 100th are able to receive rainfall year-round, states to the West of this 
meridian can go well into the fall-season before receiving significant rainfall.202 
Consequently, the economic scarcity of water access necessarily raises the value of any 
aqueous system in the West such as the Colorado River. 
Just as technological development in the 1800s laid bare the American frontier to the 
conquest of Midwestern prairies, so too did the 1900s see a similar push against Western 
water scarcity, once perceived as irredeemable, through “institutional innovations” such 
as irrigation projects and canal building.203 For such a societal shift to occur smoothly, 
Western states looking to develop economically were pressed to generate new legislation 
to ensure social efficiencies in water usage.204  
Beyond the development of rights, the expansion of institutions was also seen as 
necessary to administer over the West’s sensitive supply of water. Consequently, the 
Reclamation Act 1902 was passed, establishing the Reclamation Service under the US 
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Geological Survey (USGS).205 The Service held the lofty purpose of surveying, 
constructing, and preserving irrigation projects throughout the Western states, a 
substantial assignment.206 Tasked with maintaining the infrastructure of two-fifths of the 
continental United States, the Reclamation Service, which in the coming decades would 
become the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), was now the largest sole 
supplier of water in the country.207 The USBR retains that claim to this day and, in 
operating fifty-three hydroelectric power plants, it is the United States’ second largest 
producer of hydropower next to the Grand Coulee Dam.208  
Of the fifty-three dams in operation under the USBR, Glen Canyon Dam is 
historically significant. Formed as a result of the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 
1956, the construction of Glen Canyon Dam was completed in 1963, during the latter 
years of a nationwide boom in dam creation that spanned between 1935 and 1965.209 
Map 1: Illustration of the Annual Average Rainfall of the States Split by the 100th 
Meridian.  
 
Source: The Arizona Republic Press, Richard Nilson Blog, Map of the 100th Meridian, 
richardnilsen.com/tag/100th-meridian 
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As with any dam, the choice of its location was carefully selected in order to 
maximize its benefits and minimize the losses it produced.210 Practically speaking then, 
the construction of a dam in Glen Canyon, placed almost precisely in the middle of the 
Colorado River Basin, is understandable. At seven states wide, the area of influence of 
the Colorado River Basin is vast, and therefore economically significant, as indicated by 
Map 2.211 
The Basin is so vital to life in the West, in fact, that the dam’s initial purpose was 
simply to act as a counterweight to balance water allocation between the Upper and 
Lower Colorado Basin regions.212 No matter the Basin’s prominence, however, water 
allocation could not justify the dam’s $325 million cost, and so additional uses for the 
dam were added to its operational considerations, such as recreation and flood control.213 
By its Congressional adoption in 1956, the express purposes of Glen Canyon Dam were 
water storage, irrigation, flood control, and hydroelectric generation.214 The legitimacy of 
these claims, however, have been subject to severe question.215 
Despite the controversy of its intended use, many dams are multi-use facilities, and in 
some cases auxiliary benefits have actually become primary.216 In the case of Glen 
Canyon Dam, though hydroelectric production was not originally its primary purpose, 
according to the National Inventory of Dams (NID), today it is.217 Still, the curious shift 
in expressed purpose of the Glen Canyon Dam serves to demonstrate just one instance of 
its historical controversy.  
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Map 2: The direct range of influence of the Upper and Lower Colorado River 
Basin in the United States. 
 
A basin can be thought of as the area effected by river water and tributaries. Marked on 
the map are projects along the basin owned and operated by the Bureau of Reclamation, 
with Glen Canyon Dam nearly in the middle. The water of the basin was apportioned by 
the River Compact of 1922. 
Source: United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Map of Upper 
and Lower Basin areas and Bureau Projects, 2015 
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Not unsurprisingly, the environmentalist movement of the 1960s grew almost in 
proportion to the federal damming craze.218 Many renowned activists such as David 
Brower, the first Executive Director of the Sierra Club, were hell-bent on stopping what 
they perceived as the destruction of America’s pristine rivers and landscapes. In fact, it 
was Brower in his leadership role who, despite his never having been to the canyon itself, 
initially assented to the damming of Glen Canyon if it meant the preservation of another 
potential site of deluge, Dinosaur National Monument.219 Brower almost instantly 
regretted his decision, once writing, “Glen Canyon died, and I was partly responsible for 
its needless death,”220 though he did not give up. In 1963, Brower published The Place 
No One Knew, an homage to Glen Canyon’s forgone beauty, with powerful photographs 
by Eliot Porter lining the pages (see Picture 2). Brower’s book served to illustrate 
pictorially and linguistically the cost of human expansion upon the Western environment. 
Though certainly famous within environmentalist circles, Brower was not alone in 
writing about Glen Canyon. Surely the definitive novel on Glen Canyon Dam is the 
environmental recluse Edward Abbey’s novel The Monkey Wrench Gang, published in 
1975. Notable for its less than subtle endorsement of ecoterrorist acts, the book was the 
inspiration for the formation of the fundamentalist environmental action group, Earth 
First!. The Monkey Wrench Gang which inspired such a movement, largely reflects 
Abbey’s documented antipathy for the dam, having been filmed stating: 
I think we are morally justified to resort to whatever means are necessary 
in order to defend our land from destruction, invasion. I see this 
[motioning to Glen Canyon Dam] as an invasion. These look like creatures 
from Mars to me. I feel no kinship with that fantastic structure over there, 
no sympathy with it whatsoever. …Yeah, I would advocate sabotage, 
subversion as a last resort when political means fail.221 
 
Though no terrorist actions resulted from the work of his words or fiction, Earth 
First! did unroll a 300-foot plastic “crack” over Glen Canyon in 1981,  
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Picture 2: A Photo by Eliot Porter of Dungeon Canyon 
 
Source: Photographing Nature, reprint from The Place No One Knew, Eliot Porter, 
Dungeon Canyon, 1961: 42 
as an artistic piece, to symbolically actualize the goals of Abbey’s fictional manifesto.222 
Fifteen years later, in the fall of 1996 Brower who was not one to give up, submitted to 
the Board of Directors of the Sierra Club the idea of endorsing the decommissioning of 
the Glen Canyon dam. He claimed that by directing water through the dam’s two 
diversion tunnels, the dam would not even need to be demolished.223 The compelling idea 
is still talked about to this day.224 
At the time, the perspectives of Brower and Abbey and of organizations such as Earth 
First! were on the fringe and socially immoderate. The idea of decommissioning dams 
like Glen Canyon that society largely saw as feats of ingenuity would not be attainable. 
Today, however, there is considerable reason to believe the tide has turned.  
In 2014, the Patagonia outdoor company released the frankly titled documentary 
DamNation. The film covered the movement to decommission dams and was met with 
critical acclaim.225 In 2015 alone, 1300 dams, mostly small structures, were 
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decommissioned and deconstructed.226 And as of 2016 many major news outlets began to 
revive the largely forgotten debate on Glen Canyon’s existence.227 Former commissioner 
of the USBR Daniel Beard, recently published a scathing review of the dam and of 
department both, titling his book, Deadbeat Dams: Why We Should Abolish the US 
Bureau of Reclamation and Tear Down Glen Canyon Dam.228 
With such momentum flowing behind this movement, it is important that as public 
pressure mounts, order is maintained and the reckless removal of dams avoided. It is 
crucial that before structures of such significance are retired or kept, proper research is 
undertaken. Traditionally, first a cost benefit analysis must be undertaken. 
 
Glen Canyon Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
There is no dearth of analyses on the Glen Canyon Dam and the Colorado River 
region.229 Numerous studies have been undertaken on the recreation value, the scenic 
value, and the ecological cost of Glen Canyon Dam.230 Some even explore the 
decommissioning of Glen Canyon Dam.231 But few studies have assessed economic costs 
and benefits of Glen Canyon’s power production.232 
A most recent such study of energy production at Glen Canyon Dam was publicly 
released as of July 2016.233 The 150-page report titled, “The Impact of the Loss of 
Electric Generation at Glen Canyon Dam,” was formatted in three phases.234 Phase I 
focused on current power generation at Glen Canyon Dam and the opportunity cost of 
ceasing its power production. Despite producing the greatest amount of power of the 
hydroelectric plants of the Upper Colorado Basin, the report concludes that Glen 
Canyon’s power generation “represents only a small fraction of regional electric 
production, can be easily replaced if lost, and has been declining for two decades.”235  
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Phase I goes on to report that the average annual value of Glen Canyon’s electricity 
generation is $153 million, a fraction of a percentage of the close to $31 billion in sales 
value that the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) maintains.236 Even still, 
this calculation is a theoretical upper bound due to the excess energy reserves located 
throughout the region which do not require the dam to produce this much. Consequently, 
the true value of the energy is likely much lower. 237 
The energy produced at Glen Canyon Dam is not necessary, as other power facilities 
in the region could easily make up for the loss. In fact, data from the WECC 
demonstrates that the excess reserves of Western power through 2024 are fifty-six times 
greater than that of the Glen Canyon Dam. Since 1996 electricity generation of Glen 
Canyon Dam has been cut by a third, and its power capacity by more than half due to 
diminished water storage levels in Lake Powell and environmental regulatory restrictions. 
According to the authors of the study, “Any impacts due to the termination of [Glen 
Canyon Dam] production must be weighed against the significant electric capacity that 
has already been lost, with no negative effects on the grid.”238 In other words, despite the 
significant reduction in site production and capacity, there have been no notable regional 
effects to power use. 
Phase II of the report explored the potential effects that the loss of electricity from 
Glen Canyon Dam might have on the local population, whether directly or indirectly.239 
Almost three million individuals who receive a portion of their power from Glen Canyon 
Dam have their much of their power subsidized. So, if Glen Canyon Dam ceased its 
power generation, the direct economic loss to the consumer could be large. After being 
apportioned to the millions of individuals who receive power from Glen Canyon, 
however, the greatest estimated increase an average resident would have to pay would be 
  60 
$2.59 per month. That said, if the dam was removed fewer than one half of one percent of 
consumers would see their costs rise over $1 per month.240 
Phase III of the report acts as an addendum to Phase II. More specifically, it reports 
estimates based upon a proposed alternative plan to hydroelectric production at Glen 
Canyon called Fill Mead First (FMF).241 The costs accounted for are twofold: operational 
costs of Glen Canyon Dam and loss of potential earnings.242 The addendum concluded 
that close to $75 million in savings could be garnered with the enactment of the FMF, 
reaching almost half of the average annual value from electricity that Glen Canyon Dam 
generates.243 
By the study’s end, the authors conclude the effects of a cessation of electricity 
generation at Glen Canyon Dam would raise the price of hydroelectric power for 
residents an average of 8¢ per month. They conclude there would be a “negligible” effect 
on western power generation, and assert that ceasing power production could provide tax 
payers a yearly savings of nearly $79 million dollars in subsidies and water loss 
inefficiencies.244 
The results of the Glen Canyon CBA are significant. From these results alone one 
could easily form the opinion that Glen Canyon must fall. However, the purpose of this 
CBA was focused. Its purpose was to consider the economic costs and benefits of Glen 
Canyon’s power generation, and did not take into consideration the auxiliary purposes for 
the dam. Though it would seem the results of the report speak volumes, one must 
acknowledge that a fuller picture can still be formed.245 Notably missing from the list of 
studies done on the Glen Canyon Dam is an EROI assessment. 
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EROI Assessment and the Inputs of the Glen Canyon Dam 
 
Pricing alone cannot illustrate the value of the Glen Canyon Dam’s operation. No 
matter how informative the nature of economic information, other narratives and metrics 
must too be considered. An EROI assessment would provide insight not simply into the 
costs and benefits of the dam’s operations, but to the efficiencies over time of the dam’s 
power generation. Extensive training in systems analysis and life cycle analysis are 
helpful backgrounds for any analyst looking to form a rigorous EROI calculation. 
Because the purpose of this paper, however, is to argue that EROI analysis can augment 
the assessment of hydroelectric dam decommissioning, a simple estimate of the inputs to 
energy production will work. At the very least, such a calculation can provide an upper 
and lower bound of energy input and output at Glen Canyon. What follows, then, is a 
back-of-the-envelope EROI calculation. 
An EROIstnd will be used as the outline to calculate input and output energy of Glen 
Canyon Dam, where EROIstnd equals: 
 
Equation 6:                     𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐼!"#$ = !"#$%&  !"#$!%"&  !"  !"#$%&'!"#$%&  !"#  !"#!$%&'  !"!#$%  !"#$%!"&  !"#  !"!#$%  !"#$%&#'()                  
 
The boundaries of this assessment will be limited to Boundary 1 (mine-mouth) in the 
numerator, and Level 3 (material consumption) in the denominator. By EROIstnd in 
relation to the inputs to production and the outputs of energy from Glen Canyon Dam, 
information on its energy yield will then become available. 
 
Construction of Glen Canyon Dam 
 
Though the construction of Glen Canyon Dam was officially completed on 
September 13th, 1963, it took longer still for the hydroelectric aspects of the Glen Canyon 
unit to be completed.246 Getting to the canyon itself was problematic enough. Due to its 
isolated location, access to Glen Canyon was limited. Without ease of transportation for 
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engineers, it would take in excess of 190 miles to get from one side of the canyon to the 
other.247 Consequently, miles of highways were extended and a bridge erected to address 
the accessibility problem.248 At an estimated cost of $4 million dollars, the Glen Canyon 
Bridge allowed for the ease of transportation construction materials from railway sites.249 
Made of steel, the 1271-foot bridge is a single-span arch structure that looms more than 
200 meters above the river below (see Picture 3).250 
Picture 3: A Picture of Glen Canyon Bridge Before the Construction of Glen Canyon 
Dam. 
 
Source: US Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, picture of Glen Canyon Bridge, 
http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/gc/. 
The construction of the dam itself was a process all of its own. First two water 
diversion tunnels were dug through the walls of the canyon, with each tube 3000 feet 
long and 45-feet in diameter. Then the materials excavated to form the diversion tunnels 
were used to create a temporary dam, or coffer, which diverted the flow of the Colorado 
River through the tunnels themselves. At this point an excavation crew dug through the 
base of the canyon to begin concrete placement by June 1960. From this point, the 
construction of the dam continued 24-hours a day. Built by the stacking of concrete slabs 
seven and a half feet tall, sixty feet wide, and two hundred and ten feet long, the dam was 
made almost purely from concrete in the form of an arch. 251  According to one estimate, 
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it took 400,000 buckets of concrete, each bucket with a capacity of 24-tons, to build the 
dam.252 This process continued until September 13th, 1963 wherein the dam reached its 
peak height of 710 feet. 253 
It would take time for the hydroelectric capabilities of Glen Canyon Power Plant to be 
achieved. Though installation of power plant equipment took place directly after the 
completion of the dam, it would take a year for the first power to be generated in the dam, 
and two more before all eight hydroelectric generators were installed and running. By 
1966 the power plant was completely up and running.254 All in all, the formative process 
of the Glen Canyon Unit took about seven years.255 
 
Input and Output Factors 
 
As the previous section suggests, accounting for all the inputs into the construction of 
a dam such as Glen Canyon is a complex process. By converting estimates of the 
materials it took to construct Glen Canyon Dam, rough calculations of the facility’s 
inputs to production can be calculated. One estimate places the total material input 
towards the formation of Glen Canyon Dam at “five million barrels of cement, ten 
million yards of aggregate, three million board-feet of lumber, 130,000 tons of steel, 
20,000 tons of aluminum, 5,000 tons of copper, and a peak workforce of 2,500.”256 An 
additional 8,218,000 pounds of steel, 110,000 pounds of aluminum, and 2,550 cubic 
yards of concrete were also required to erect Glen Canyon Bridge.257 As for the output, 
this information is largely accessible. According to the Bureau of Reclamation, of the 
eight generators at the Glen Canyon Dam, each has the capacity to generate 165,000-
kilowatts of power, with a total installed capacity of 1,320,000 kilowatts.258  
Still, even with a relatively renewable resource such as hydropower, for every unit of 
energy produced, other sources of energy are consumed. These units are often derived 
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from the embodied energy in the materials needed to generate power. In 2009 a life cycle 
analysis was conducted on the Glen Canyon hydropower generation. Table 1 illustrates 
its findings. 
Table 1: Non-Renewable Energy Depletion per 1,000 GWh Generated at the Glen 
Canyon Dam 
 
      Source: Life Cycle Impact Assessment, 2009, amended Table 6.16: 6-37 
Of the non-renewable energy resources depleted in the process of power generation at 
the dam, an inventory of crude oil, natural gas, coal, and uranium in ore was taken. 
According to the report, non-renewables consumed were measured in tons (t) to scale for 
every 1000 gigawatt hours (GWh) of energy generated at Glen Canyon Dam. For every 
ton of energy resources generated, an equivalent “stressor” was measured. A stressor was 
defined as any throughput (input, output, or direct physical activity) associated with a 
corresponding good, service, material or system that can be linked to externalities. To 
classify these stressors, a Stressor Characterization Factor (SCF) of each non-renewable 
was calculated. By using a weighted mathematical function, analysts determined the 
impact of resource depletion converted to a proportion of energy in gigajoules per ton 
(GJ/t). In doing so, an energy equivalent of depleted non-renewables was derived at 1088 
GJ per 1000 gigawatt hours generated at the dam.259 By using the results of this study, the 
non-renewable resource cost of hydropower output can be measured. 
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As of 2007, the total power generated by the Glen Canyon Power Plant was 1 kilowatt 
hours (KWh), or 3,454.846789 GWh.260 According to the LCA analysis, for every 1,000 
GWh of energy produced at Glen Canyon Dam, 1,088 GJ of energy are also expended.261 
Therefore, as of 2007, 12986.33 GJ in non-renewable energy was also spent towards 
hydroelectric generation. With this data and the aforementioned details, a competent 
estimate can be achieved for EROIstnd. 
 
Results 
 
 The results of EROIstnd were calculated from a combination of the above data and 
information of the Bureau of Reclamation. The conversion table in Table 2 represents a 
brief overview of the conversions process for inputs and outputs. For more details about 
the calculation process see Appendix A. 
 
Table 2: Overview of Input-Energy Conversions and Output Flow as of 2007 in 
Gigajoules from Glen Canyon Dam. 
Inputs GJ Output in 
GWh 
EROIstnd 
Aluminum 2,547,103  
 
 
3,454.85 
     12,437,44840,958,290  
Copper 815,105 
Steel 3,065,874 
Cement 34,053,401 
Lumber 14,694 
Aggregate 462,111 
Non-Renewables/1000 GWh 12,986 
Total in GJ 40,958,290  12,437,448 0.3036613 
  Source: Input-energy conversions made from Murphy (2011): 1901, Table 3 
 
EROIstnd 
 
Due to the approximated nature of this study, there assuredly exist energy inputs that 
have been accounted for in the EROI estimate of Glen Canyon Dam. For instance, the 
amount of energy it took to create the eight generators for the Glen Canyon power plant, 
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and their replacements over time, is still unknown, though their embodied energy is 
assumed to be significant. For the remainder of this analysis, then, it should be 
appreciated that the denominator of EROIstnd is underestimated. The results of EROIstnd 
therefore only become more noticeable.  
After calculating the power produced over the embodied energy from the inputs of 
extraction, a total of 12,437,448 GJ in hydroelectric output has been produced from Glen 
Canyon Dam from 1966 to 2007, requiring 40,972,082 GJ of material input to do so. 
EROIstnd of the dam is therefore equal to roughly .30356, or a 1:3 ratio. In other words, 
for every 1 unit of energy output produced at Glen Canyon Dam, 3 units of energy are 
expended. 
This is a significant and unexpected finding. Despite the conservative estimations 
made, and the unaccounted-for inputs that would have made the EROI only smaller, 
EROIstnd still demonstrates the minimal hydroelectric usefulness of Glen Canyon Dam.  
To be sure, this result is uncommon of hydroelectric dams. By contrast, the EROIstnd 
after forty years at the Fljotsdalsstod hydroelectric plant in Iceland is estimated at 74.8 or 
an almost 525:7 ratio, indicating that the power generated at Glen Canyon Dam is 
negligible. 262 In fact, assuming a constant rate of the electricity production from 1966, it 
would take until the year 2098 for the dam to even reach a 1:1 output to input ratio. Yet 
this too is assuredly an underestimate as for the last 10 years, the amount of energy 
produced at Glen Canyon Dam has decreased.263 
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Picture 4: Calciferous white marks upon the canyon wall mark the almost 100-foot “bath 
tub ring” as Glen Canyon’s Lake Powell Reservoir recedes. 
 
Source: Chris McGreal, “Disappearing Lake Powell…”, The Guardian, 2015 
The results of EROIstnd should not be taken without further context. At 45% capacity, 
Lake Powell, the source of Glen Canyon’s hydroelectric power, is shrinking at a 
precipitous rate. For the past 15 years, the rate of snowfall in the Rocky Mountains has 
declined as low 56 percent, significantly reducing the water level of Lake Powell. There 
are few signs that this drought, the longest in 100 years, will let up any time soon.264 
Correspondingly, breaking even at a 1:1 ratio by the year 2098 may be a calculation 
based on optimism. Indeed, as climatological instability becomes the norm, there is little 
reason to believe that power production at Glen Canyon Dam will see a significant 
increase any time soon. It then stands to reason that in future years EROIstnd will not grow 
at constant, or even significant rate, calling into question the very purpose of Glen 
Canyon Dam itself. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
Arguably, EROI analysis is a valuable and important tool in determining the 
efficiency and usefulness of hydroelectric dams. In the case of Glen Canyon Dam, a 
distinct picture was painted when EROIstnd yielded a low return on energy investment of 
1:3. The impact of EROIstnd was even more impactful because as a metric it described the 
primary hydroelectric function of Glen Canyon Dam in a simple and clear manner that a 
comparable metric such as cost benefit analysis was not able to do. 
As has been noted, the decommissioning of dams is an involved and complex 
process, though this reality does not stop researchers from trying to simplify matters. In 
his paper “Dam Removal: A Taxonomy with Implications for Economic Analysis,” 
Professor of Environmental Economics Mark Griffin Smith of Colorado College, has 
explained just some of the criteria involved in the decision for dam removal. Dividing 
these criteria into the physical and the economic, Smith has noted that engineers and 
natural scientists concentrate on the physical, whereas economists often convert the 
manifest into the monetary, the tangible into price.265 Equally if not more important, 
however, is the acknowledgement that beyond the physical and economic, social factors 
ultimately decide whether a dam is decommissioned or otherwise, and they always have. 
Whether it was before the advent of metrics like CBA, or after when such metrics 
were heavily relied upon, the truth of the matter is society has always decided the fate of 
damming projects. Social factors such as water scarcity in the west or scenic value of a 
canyon are influential cultural factors in decision-making. Surely these issues must also 
be taken into consideration when contemplating the decommissioning of a dam such as 
Glen Canyon.  
From the beginning, the purpose of Glen Canyon has been varied. Recreational usage, 
water storage for irrigation, and the flood control of a sometimes-tumultuous Colorado 
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River, all add into the purposefulness of Glen Canyon Dam, and all must be considered in 
the use value of the dam itself. Still, the added benefit of EROI is that it interlinks the 
fields that Smith perceives to be so disparate, the physical and the economic, helping to 
bridge what he cites as a “misunderstanding between these two approaches.”266 Even so, 
leaving humans to its interpretation, EROI too could be just as susceptible to abuse as 
cost benefit analysis, or any other metric.  
Certainly, it has been demonstrated that energy returns on energy invested is the very 
“new way of thinking” about dam removal that the Aspen Institute claimed was needed to 
make “optimal decisions.”267 That said, it is simply a number from which the realities of 
the world are better presented, no more, no less. If society decided that EROI was a more 
important metric than CBA, that EROI should hold importance beyond its supplementary 
role, this would also be to society’s detriment. The energy expended to create Glen 
Canyon Dam, or any dam, is a sunk cost. Moving forward, ex ante estimates should be 
made of dams before they are created. For those dams that already exist, EROI is useful 
in deciding what future actions should be taken of the dam. For instance, does society 
wish to wait over a hundred years for the EROI of Glen Canyon Dam to reach a 1:1 ratio? 
Or perhaps society figures it would be just as useful to decommission the dam now, 
expending energy in the process, to gain the benefits of a free-flowing canyon landscape. 
What is clear is that without the information provided by EROI, such decisions would not 
likely be given credence. 
To be clear, whereas a CBA on the discontinuation of energy production at Glen 
Canyon Dam could describe monetarily the consequences of such an action, its scope was 
limited. It was not enough, for example, to describe the imbalance of energy output-to-
input of the dam. Where EROI analysis excels then, is its ability to succinctly describe 
whether the practice of damming breaks even, whether energy inputs at least equal 
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energy outputs. In the specific case of Glen Canyon Dam, with an EROIstnd of 1:3, the 
answer seems to be a resounding no. Once information such as this can be gleaned by 
those studying the usefulness of a dam, efficient decisions can be made. With that said, 
EROI analysis should not in and of itself be a singularly determinative metric.  
In the field of economics, decision-making is understood to be influenced by 
asymmetries of information. In his acceptance speech for his work on information and 
decision-making, Nobel Laureate and economist Joseph Stiglitz stated: 
Information affects decision making in every context. …There are 
asymmetries of information between those governing and those governed, 
and just as markets strives [sic.] to overcome asymmetries of information, 
we need to look for ways by which the scope for asymmetries of 
information in political processes can be limited and their consequences 
mitigated.268 
 
In other words, what a party knows will help determine the choices they will make, no 
matter the market or the context. In political processes where market transactions are 
forgone for public exchanges, optimal decision-making only becomes more opaque. The 
culprit of choice is not only adverse selection, where one party holds asymmetric 
information about the quality of a product or its intended use. Incentives, especially 
regarding public choice, also significantly influence decisions. 
To justify themselves, politicians have often relied upon socially “objective” metrics, 
such as cost benefit analysis, for support. For the reason of its perceived objectivity, a 
brief history of cost benefit analysis was provided in Chapter 2. An account of the 
analysis was afforded not simply for historical context, but to demonstrate the political 
and social incentives behind the well-intentioned measurement. With what economists 
now know about the power of incentives, it was posited, it would be naïve to assert that 
so many thousands of dams were built simply out of interest for the public in the 20th 
Century. The calculations may well be strong, and the rules by which they are derived 
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may be ironclad, but even a brief overview of the CBA process indicates the inability of a 
regular politician to comprehend the measurement’s intricacies.  
As much as human progress has dissociated the modern day from the past, behaviors 
and motivation are largely driven by the same forces. For thousands of years humans 
engaged in public works projects because the desired benefits to those in power 
outweighed their perceived costs. These decisions were not made under the guise of the 
scientific method, but by socio-political forces—forces that, until recent centuries, were 
not beholden to public accountability in the same way. As pressure mounted through the 
democratic process, cost benefit analysis allowed politicians to divest themselves of 
responsibility by placing trust in outside forces such as the US Army Corps of Engineers 
and the Bureau of Reclamation. The reliance upon outside authorities only strengthened 
the process of adverse selection due to the explicit and unquestioned trust the Corps held 
of politicians.269 This blind faith invariably ensured the engineers had a backlog of 
projects and funding, a strong incentive for the Corps to weigh benefits over costs if there 
ever was one.270 
This is not to say that when properly approached cost benefit analysis is not 
worthwhile. In Chapter 4 cost benefit analysis was used in tandem with EROIstnd to form 
a grander narrative about the efficiency of power production at Glen Canyon Dam. It is to 
say, however, that motivation has far more to do with perception of objectivity in metrics 
than has been commonly admitted in the past. Simply put, the findings of cost benefit 
analysis should not be interpreted as the gospel truth by decision-makers, but as one 
mode of many, in presenting suggestive figures. In practice, few metrics should ever be 
used alone.  
In their 2010 book, Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up, Nobel 
Laureates Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz came to a similar conclusion. Based on 
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findings from a council of some of the world’s most prestigious economists, the authors 
conclude that no singular metric should be used in describing the quality of people’s lives 
or the state of an economy. Instead, a “dashboard” of measurements should be interpreted 
to insure a wider range of understanding.271 Though the committee’s findings are 
laudable and mirror the assertions made here about the use of CBA and EROI analyses 
together, they also speak to a larger trend within economics. 
Since 1998, a significant number of winners of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences 
have been figures whose research has fundamentally questioned the role of economics in 
starting in the 1960s and 1970s. Awards have gone to forbearers of non-traditional 
economic fields such as Development, Behavioral, Informational Economics, or to 
academics who use traditional theory in untraditional ways.272 This has not been a 
statistical anomaly, but has been a formal recognition of a new approach to economics. 
Unfortunately, this shift has not been total or all-encompassing. 
Put frankly, how is it that a committee of the greatest minds in economics needs to 
come together to point out that the world cannot be simplified into one metric? Why did 
it take so long for the father of modern growth measurement Robert Solow to begin to 
consider the role natural systems play in the macroeconomy? And how is it that it needs 
to be argued that cost benefit analysis should be used as an explanatory device rather than 
predictive metric? The impetus behind these questions is emblematic of the greater 
problem of the closed system of economic thought. In his inspirational article on 
thermodynamics and economics, “Energy and Economic Myths,” Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen claimed:  
Nothing illustrates better the basic epistemology of standard economics 
than the usual graph by which almost every introductory manual portrays 
the economic process as a self-sustaining, circular flow between 
“production” and “consumption.” But even money does not circulate back 
and forth within the economic process; for both bullion and paper money 
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ultimately become worn out and their stocks must be replenished from 
external sources. The crucial point is that the economic process is not an 
isolated, self-sustaining process. This process cannot go on without a 
continuous exchange which alters the environment in a cumulative way 
and without being, in its turn, influence by these alterations.273 
 
Put another way, the typical circular flow model of economics which Georgescu-Roegen 
critiques, and that is still taught today, is fundamentally flawed because of the 
endogeneity of its inputs. There has been an increased call to change the fundamental 
axioms of economics today into a new model. Popular figures in economics like Stiglitz 
have made calls for a change in the predominant economic paradigm, and lesser-known 
players like Charles A. S. Hall have influenced future economists such as myself to lead 
the charge to integrate the natural sciences with economics.274 
Starting small helps. As Temple Grandin, Professor of Animal Science at Colorado 
State University, recently argued, a prevailing culture has been perpetuated that allows 
individuals to push forward grandiose solutions that hold no feasibility in the real 
world.275 This “abstractification” of theory over practice, is not the catalyst of lasting, 
systemic change.276 Small-scale, applicable change that can be put into practice by those 
in the field through trial and error is the stuff of change. In this way, EROI analysis is one 
such beneficial shift.  
By assessing dams through the energy returns on energy invested method, the 
increasingly pertinent question of dam feasibility in the 21st Century can be tested. EROI 
analysis should not be perceived as usurper of CBA, but as one tool in the toolbox of 
metrics analysts possess to comprehend the immitigable factors that go into the 
decommissioning of dams. In using EROI analysis, the additional consideration of energy 
inputs will add further nuance to the closed system under which economics typically 
operates. 
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*Appendix A 
 
Output in 
GWh c. 2007 3,454.85 
Total in GJ 12,437,448.44 
 
Aluminum US Tons Metric Tons GJ 
Dam 20,000 18,144 2,540,118.000 
Bridge 55 49.8952 6,985.325 
Total 20,055 18,194 2,547,103.325 
 
Copper US Tons Metric Tons GJ 
Total 5,000 4,535.9250 815,105.723 
 
Steel US Tons Metric Tons GJ 
Dam 130,000 117,934.050 2,971,938.060 
Bridge 4,109 3,727.623 93,936.104 
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Total 134,109 121,661.673 3,065,874.164 
  
Cement M3 Kgs Metric Tons GJ 
Dam 4,110,000 6,188,591,400 6,188,591.400 34,037,252.7 
Bridge 1,950 2,936,193 2,936.193 16,149.0615 
Total 4,111,950 6,191,527,593 6,191,527.593 34,053,401.76 
 
Lumber Board Feet US Tons Metric Tons GJ 
Total 3,000,000 6,951.8252891103 6,306.58981742695 14,694.35427460480 
 
Aggregate Yards M3 Kgs Metric Tons GJ 
Total 10,000,000 9,144,000 22,005,312,712.490 22,005,312.72149 462,111.5672 
 
 
* Input-energy conversions made from Murphy (2011): 1901, Table 3 
